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ABSTRACT: 
 
 
 
The US administration and military entered into a Fourth Generational Warfare 
war in Iraq in 2003 without having sufficiently evolved their practices to succeed 
in the same. A focus on Third Generational Warfare, and a lack of priority given 
to the psy-cultural battleground, led to an expensive and protracted engagement 
to satisfy US security requirements. This thesis will examine the contrasting ideas 
regarding the future of warfare, and then use the Iraq War of 2003 for specific 
examples of the failure to evolve to meet the demands of 4GW. The failure to 
evolve came from the top. 
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Introduction 
 
 
 
 
The US military is the best funded and most technologically advanced in the world 
today. It boasts the ability to remotely pilot drones capable of beaming images of 
targets back to operators comfortably seated a few miles from their homes in the 
US, with the option of selecting to fire on those targets, all without ever risking a 
US life. Smart bombs, laser guided missiles, and F-22 Raptors are all at the 
command of the US military commanders, with their use guided by a level of 
situational awareness never before thought possible, thanks to intelligence 
gathering capabilities that far outstrip all previous efforts. The US military is a 
behemoth that should be capable of outclassing any foe, and yet, in Iraq from 2003 
until 2011, this military giant was unable to defeat a rag-tag bunch of militia, 
insurgents, and „dead-enders‟. The 2003 US „liberation‟ of the Iraqi people became 
viewed by many of them as an invasion to be countered instead. This thesis will 
firstly examine the ideas around future uses of the military, and then show that 
the US prepared for one particular type of war in Iraq, and found itself embroiled 
in another, one which it was distinctly unprepared for. 
 
 
 
Specifically I posit that the engagement in Iraq from 2003 until 2011 was an 
example of Fourth Generational Warfare (4GW), as described by Col. Thomas X. 
Hammes, which the US was unprepared to face. A mistaken belief in technological 
superiority, in part based on the faith in the supposed Revolution in Military Affairs 
(RMA), led the US to prepare for a Third Generational Warfare (3GW) conflict, 
causing the US to cede the all-important psy-cultural battleground early on. 4GW 
“…is rooted in the fundamental precept that superior political will, when properly 
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applied, can defeat greater economic and military power…” (Hammes 2006). It 
involves the protracted use of Counter Insurgency (COIN) against an evolved type 
of insurgency, one made up of loosely affiliated groups using all available networks 
to pursue their only joint goal: the enemy‟s defeat and withdrawal. As such, it 
involves post-conflict reconstruction where necessary, and a willingness to plan for 
extended engagements of decades and more. In short, it is the very antithesis of 
the high-technology short term war that the US envisaged in Iraq, and 
subsequently incorrectly planned and resourced for. 
 
 
 
 
„Liberators‟ and „liberated‟ view themselves in the context of their own narratives, 
and can revolt against being placed in alternative roles within other accounts. 
Mutual understanding can be lost as each group ascribes emotions and motivations 
onto the other, with bewilderment and anger on both sides. American troops 
entering Iraq in 2003 with their commander in chiefs‟ exhortation to “...free its 
people...” were also entering into a narrative of mutual frustration already played 
out in theatres of conflict throughout the world. US expectations of being feted as 
benevolent liberators, and welcomed with cheering crowds throwing flowers 
crumbled in the face of a lacklustre reception and the growth of an armed 
insurgency. The descent into increasing violence and a protracted COIN campaign 
as the US seemed unable to cede governance to the Iraqi people was not a unique 
situation, and it was also not inevitable. Both by their actions and their inactions 
the US administration exacerbated existing difficulties and failed to understand 
and control the situation on the ground. Through ignoring advice that didn‟t mesh 
with the best case scenario envisioned and failing to understand the nature of the 
warfare they were engaging in, the US administration‟s wishful thinking and poor 
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planning led to chaotic mismanagement, and a protracted involvement in unpopular 
actions. Force was deployed and expended without utility and thus ultimately 
wasted. The US refusal to countenance planning for worst case post-war scenarios 
or engage with Iraqi points of view (other than those of a privileged few) led to a 
flawed psywar campaign in which the targeting of political will was not prioritised, 
and was ineffectively carried out. Instead the US focused on a mass of men, 
materiel and technology as cornerstones of the campaign, upon which 4GW is not 
dependent. 
 
 
 
Psywar, an intrinsic part of 4GW as it pertains to targeting will, can prove 
problematic to pin down with a clear and all-encompassing definition. In similarity 
with other such nebulous terms as “terrorism”, the parameters of the definition to 
some extent depends upon who is setting them. The US Department of Defense 
(DoD) has set their own parameters and given their own definitions a number of 
times. To paraphrase the most recent DoD definitions, it includes the use of 
propaganda and other psychological actions. The primary purpose is to influence 
the opinions, emotions, attitudes and ultimately behaviours of foreign hostile 
groups in such a way as to support the achievement of national objectives. (Joint 
Chiefs of Staff 2003) 
 
 
 
Psywar can be an intrinsic part of many military and even civilian operations, 
making it difficult to distil the „psychological action‟ out of a more general action. 
Psywar goes far beyond leaflet drops and radio and TV broadcasts, it encompasses 
more subtle actions than pure communication through multiple mediums. Merely 
broadcasting your message, the signal, is not sufficient to win the political will 
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needed to succeed in the achievement of national objectives. Ensuring that the 
signal is not drowned by the noise is more than communication, it is effective 
psywar. Understanding the noise that will impact on your attempts to win over the 
populace is part of the preparations that should take place prior to engagement. 
 
 
 
The effective psywar practitioner needs to have a clear and in depth 
understanding of their own society and culture, as well as that of their enemy. An 
understanding of the enemy armed forces and their capabilities, equipment and 
tactics is no longer enough. In psywar the weight has shifted from targeting the 
enemy‟s armed forces, to targeting their civilian‟s and decision maker‟s attitudes. 
Thus the idea of how actions would be perceived, as well as what they directly 
accomplished, is an important consideration for the successful 4GW practitioner, 
as well as commanding a proven ability to manipulate or at least fully utilise the 
media. For example, during the Intifada, young Palestinian boys threw stones and 
sticks at the Israeli army tanks making their way into the camps. Although of 
course this method caused absolutely no physical damage to the tanks or in any 
way impeded their progress, the media coverage of this was invaluable in 
presenting the disparity between the opposing sides, and led to a huge up swell of 
support for the „defenceless‟ Palestinians. Thus the tactic of not using armed 
militants to impend the tanks progress, whilst on the battlefield a complete failure 
in that it could not stop the tanks approach, was overall a massive success in that 
it increased support for the Palestinian cause and diminished it for the Israelis. 
(Hammes 2006) In 4GW success is not measured in the number of enemy killed or 
the amount of territory advanced, and superior force and numbers is no guarantee 
of victory. A protagonist can suffer repeated military defeat and yet emerge 
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victorious from the war. Whilst hesitant to invoke the spectre of Vietnam, there 
are echoes of this in that conflict, with a particular example the Tet Offensive, a 
military defeat for the Vietcong but a huge public relations victory. (Arnold 1990) 
 
 
 
4GW would require a strong psywar plan and campaign; the human terrain placed 
at the forefront of any discussions about strategy and post war stability. Military 
actions and political statements should have been considered within the 
framework of a coherent and culturally astute psywar strategy, itself based on true 
intelligence and thorough research and analysis. Force should have been used with 
utility, with the strategic goal of a democratic Iraq as the overall target; a target 
achievable only by first prioritising and capturing the will of the Iraqi people. 
Instead, the US planned for a 3GW war with a mass of men, materiel and 
technological superiority, and failed to use this force with utility, thus negating 
the advantages this force contained in comparison to the enemy‟s once the 3GW 
phase was over. The US positioned itself as a generous and powerful benefactor, 
reluctantly entering into a conflict to protect itself and its allies and remove the 
yoke of subjugation from the Iraqi people. In this narrative, the Iraqi people were 
a downtrodden citizenry eagerly awaiting the removal of their tyrannical dictator 
in order to embrace democracy and western style freedom. In this simplified story, 
with their superior firepower and military might the US would sweep into Iraq, 
remove Saddam Hussein, acknowledge the accolades of the Iraqi people and leave 
the country as a good example of democracy within the region. Existing studies 
completed by the US military and the Department of Defense regarding the 
feasibility of such a grandiose plan, for example in reports such as 1999 “Desert 
Crossing”, pointed out the fallacies of such simplistic thinking, and spoke in more 
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measured tones regarding the state of the existing Iraqi infrastructure, the 
likelihood of civil war, and the repercussions of US involvement and regime 
change. The conclusions of Desert Crossing were not heeded, and the US military 
was deployed without a coherent post-war plan. 
 
 
 
It is worth remembering that the US military spent only twenty-seven days, from 
the 20th  of March to the 15th  of April 2003, on what might be termed „conventional‟ 
military action, the 3GW phase of the war. This was the time during which the 
force used had utility. If the aim of the US administration had been to depose a 
dictator, destabilise a country, and end as the only military force still in play, then 
the campaign aims would have been achieved. With the fall of Tikrit, the US 
military had shown the efficiency of their massed firepower, technological 
superiority and deployment systems. An opposing force had been routed, and 
although Saddam had not been captured, the US was effectively the force and 
power in the majority of the country. 
 
 
 
During combat operations, and prior to the official start of the conflict, the psywar 
elements of the campaign had been mostly well funded and, in so far as psywar 
can be judged, successful in their limited aims. A significant number of Iraqi Army 
personnel did return to their homes as leaflets exhorted them to rather than fight. 
As countless „liberating‟ forces have discovered throughout history, however, 
liberation involves more than removing an existing regime. The US had been clear 
that one of the reasons for entering Iraq had been to liberate the Iraqi people; to 
free them from the tyranny of the dictator Saddam Hussein. Although many 
military successes could be counted in the twenty seven days of war, the 
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achievement of a liberated Iraq was not one of them. Nor had the US effectively 
managed to capture the will of the Iraqi people; the main aim in any 4GW. The 
force the US had deployed ceased to have utility after the end of conventional 
manoeuvres. The momentum that had carried the military to victory seemed to 
dissipate as troops awaited further instructions and clarification of their new role 
and level of authority with Iraq. 
 
 
 
Immediately after the end of what could be classed as the 3GW phase of the 
operation, the troops were stalled without clear aims and authority levels. The 
previous regime had been destabilised and defeated but with no coherent post-war 
strategy and aims the troops on the ground were left floundering. With the 
removal of the old regime‟s tyrannical forces of law and order and the lack of a 
new system to take their place, crime and social unrest exploded. The US military 
had not adapted its practices, and the US administration had not advanced their 
foreign policies to facilitate a smooth transition from one regime to another. 
Looting, destruction, and a general breakdown of security and services resulted, 
eventually forming into a fully-fledged insurgency backed by other power players 
in the region. Increasingly unable to cede power and responsibility to an Iraqi-led 
government, and facing a ratcheting up of pressure domestically and 
internationally, the US found itself trapped in an almost universally unpopular war 
of occupation. The US entered the region with the mind-set of a benevolent 
liberator, the perception shift to viewing themselves as an occupier COIN force 
was a jarring one that could not be completed easily or quickly. More time was 
lost, and more battleground ceded whilst the US attempted to come to terms with 
their role in Iraq and respond to the ever worsening situation on the ground. The 
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insistence on planning for a 3GW war, with expectations of gratitude and 
spontaneous imitation of US democracy, hamstrung the US war effort before the 
first troops hit the ground. I will show that the failure to evolve to meet the 
demands of modern interconnected warfare plunged the US military into a war 
with no clear aims, where their force had no utility, and continued to keep them 
there whilst the US administration grappled for a face-saving solution. 
 
 
 
In Chapter One I create four original definitions of the competing ideologies about 
the future of warfare, in which I will place and examine the concept of 4GW. This 
will include a comprehensive literature review demonstrating that 4GW is a useful 
concept and framework to utilise in this thesis. In Chapter Two I briefly examine 
the pre-war stage; the holes in the plans that were created and the failure to 
correctly identify and plan for potential 4GW. In Chapter Three I will show how the 
US botched communication, and resisted learning from the errors made, miring 
themselves in fiasco. In Chapter Four I will examine four particular examples of US 
4GW failures, and contrast this to a small Special Forces success in one area of the 
country to show that overall failure was not inevitable. Ultimately I will show that 
the US had failed to evolve their capabilities to succeed in a 4GW environment. 
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Chapter One: The Future of Warfare 
 
 
To examine the 2003 war in Iraq, an explanation and exploration of the concept of 
 
4GW is first needed. As with all theories, 4GW and the idea of evolutions in 
warfare is a contested concept. 4GW is but one of many current concepts seeking 
to set out the modern style of warfare in an understandable conceptual 
framework. As this thesis examines the role of the US military and administration 
in the 2003 Iraq War, the pertinent concepts under discussion may be framed as 
responses to the question of the type of war that the US will need to engage in in 
the future in order to maintain global dominance. I would suggest that there are 
four broad groups of commentators: 
 
1.  Those who would argue that the US will primarily face enemies that will 
require the US to practise what is essentially 4GW, and COIN, 
2.  Others who insist that a future inter-state war between evenly matched 
powers is not „imaginary‟ but imminent and should thus be prioritised, 
which almost always includes more developed tech as part of a Revolution 
in Military Affairs (RMA), 
3.  Those who plan for the military to be able to do everything rather than 
specialise, and 
4.  Finally, those who argue that most of the military action in the future will 
be Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW). 
 
I will briefly examine the current dominant writing and thinking in each of these 
areas. Many of the concepts under discussion have been debated for decades, and 
refined to fit the emerging global realities as wars have started, threatened, and 
fizzled out. In this chapter I will finally look at the much touted RMA as it pertains 
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to the US military. I believe that 4GW is a useful and pertinent definition of 
warfare that, despite being decades old, holds true in the principles to the 
emergent warfare the US is now involved in, and is thus a valid description of the 
warfare the US faced in Iraq at the conclusion of the 3GW stage of the war. 
 
No valid commentator has tried to argue that warfare has remained unaltered and 
unchanged since it was first waged; all fundamentally agree that there have been 
evolutions and changes in methods, tactics, technology, and the economic-social 
bond during warfare. Most also draw the dividing lines in the same broad strokes as 
Hammes, author of the 2006 work The Sling and The Stone: On War in the 21st 
Century, upon which my understanding of evolutionary changes in generational 
warfare has been based.  Most tend to start with Napoleonic warfare; great 
“armies of unprecedented size on country–smashing campaigns of conquest through 
decisive manoeuvre and, usually, battle” (Sheehan 2010, 47), which chimes with 
Hammes‟ definition of the peak of 1GW to be the Napoleonic wars of the early 19th 
century, very aptly so in the face of Napoleon‟s assertion that “Victory goes to the 
large battalion” (Nagl 2002, xii). 
 
The next change was the industrialisation of war, with civilian technologies such as 
railways, telegraph etc, and new weapons such as rifled and breech loading 
weapons, and with governments mobilising the populations to support the war. 
Hammes defines this as 2GW, and sees a key characteristic as the defensive having 
a clear advantage and priority over the offensive. (Hammes 2006) Whilst other 
theorists do not necessarily label this 2GW, with Michael Sheehan for example 
taking WW1 as an example of his classification of „total war‟ (Sheehan 2010), the 
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industrialisation of war is nevertheless recognised a change in the type of warfare 
quite distinct from what had gone before. 
 
Sheehan includes WW2 in his definition of „total war‟, which he determines was a 
conflict between mass armies, with technology more or less equal on both sides, 
hence difficult to reach a decisive victory or defeat. As a result, new technologies 
such as tanks and chemical weapons created to regain the upper hand. Air power 
emerged, although this was not decisive until WW2. Societies were fully mobilised, 
and “state‟s economic and human resources increasingly seen as legitimate 
targets.” (Sheehan 2010, 60) Hammes instead considers WW2 to be the epitome of 
3GW. Blitzkrieg favoured the use of small concentrated units of mechanised power 
to shatter initial resistance, followed by the use of standard infantry to exploit 
gaps created in the defences and win territory.  Manoeuvrability and leaders at the 
front of the engagement ready to respond to the changing situation on the ground 
were the key to initial success of the German armed forces. (Hammes 2006) 
 
Within this time period there were specific advances in naval and air power 
technologies, with some decided that these are important enough to warrant their 
own categories of warfare. Sheehan discusses Naval Warfare as a discrete section, 
as he does Nuclear War, and Revolutionary War. Other considered categories 
include Space War (Jordan 2008). Whatever the classifications given, agreement 
has been reached that whilst the nature of war does not change, the prevalent 
method of warfare does. From this agreement, the debate about which type of 
warfare the US should prepare for starts. 
 
In stating that the US was entering a 4GW war, it is important to examine exactly 
what that means, and the critiques that have been raised regarding this definition. 
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In his 2006 book; The Sling and The Stone: On War in the 21st  Century, and also 
in numerous articles, such as his 2006 article in the Contemporary Security Policy 
issue that was dedicated to 4GW, Hammes defines it thusly: 
 
“4GW uses all available networks – political, economic, social and military – to 
convince the enemy‟s political decision-makers that their strategic goals are either 
unachievable or too costly for the perceived benefit. It is rooted in the 
fundamental precept that superior political will, when properly applied, can 
defeat greater economic and military power. 4GW does not attempt to win by 
defeating the enemy‟s military forces. Instead, combining guerrilla tactics or civil 
disobedience with the soft networks of social, cultural and economic ties, 
disinformation campaigns and innovative political activity, it directly attacks the 
enemy‟s political will. .. Strategically it focuses on breaking the will of decision 
makers. … Finally, 4GW practitioners plan for long wars – decades rather than 
months or years. … It is the antithesis of the high-technology, short war the 
pentagon is preparing to fight.” (Hammes 2006) 
 
In examining the history of 4GW, Hammes states that “The first practitioner to 
both write about and successfully execute a 4GW {was} Mao Tse-Tung…” (Hammes 
2006, 197) Other examples given include the Vietnam War, in Nicaragua, the 
Palestinian Intifada, and of course, the 2003 Iraq War. With each use of 4GW it has 
been refined, and tactics improved to take advantage of the new technologies. For 
example, the first Palestinian Intifada was totally reliant on mass media and 
international networks to get their message across, and thus neutralise the 
comparatively overwhelming military might of Israel. However, it is not the use of 
these networks that define 4GW, useful as they are as a method of attacking the 
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enemy‟s political will. Hammes states that “4GW practitioners have used networks 
successfully for a variety of reasons” (Hammes 2006, 210), and that “Networks 
have clearly evolved as the most effective way for small groups to take on major 
powers” (Hammes 2006, 219). However, he goes on to point out that “4GW has 
been around for over 70 years” (Hammes 2006, 219), and that during many of the 
earlier engagements, networks, in particular late 20th  and early 21st  century 
 
communication networks, did not exist. 
In conversation with Hammes via email to the author of this thesis, he clarified; 
“…it is not the network paths or method that are important as much as the 
 
idea that one does not have to defeat the enemy's armed forces to win. The 
idea of network paths was not well developed during the US-Vietnam War. 
While some will point to TV news, remember that the news was limited to 3 
national channels and their 30 minute evening reports. (5 days a week) 
Further, only about 5 minutes of each report might be dedicated to 
Vietnam.  Nor were there high technology networks leading back to the 
Soviet leadership when the Soviets were driven out of Afghanistan. One can 
make an argument for network impact on the Israeli withdrawal but it took 
almost 20 years.  Other conflicts show that defeating the will does not 
require extensive networks -- Algerian-French, Angolan-Portuguese, Britain- 
Aden, and others. 
 
 
 
My contention is that the idea of attacking the will of the enemy decision 
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makers is key to 4GW. The increasing type and variety of networks are 
useful tools for executing that intent but are not essential.”1 
 
As a concept, 4GW has come under criticism. There are those in Group 2 who 
believe that the US can and should stay out of insurgencies, 4GW, and all other 
forms of warfare that do not play to US strengths. John Ferris, Antulio J. 
Echevarria II, Michael Evans, and Rod Thorton, writing in response to Hammes 
article on 4GW, argue that to think of warfare in distinct evolutionary stages is 
fallacious, with Evans stating that “A belief in a linear sequence of three discrete 
generations of manpower, firepower and manoeuvre in the evolution of modern 
warfare cannot be sustained…” (Evans 2006, 244) However Hammes does not ever 
suggest that only one type of warfare can exist at a time, pointing out that “…a 
quick survey of modern conflict shows that all generations of modern war and even 
pre-modern tribal war continue to take place today.” (Hammes 2006, 280) It is 
therefore not useful to critique 4GW on this count. It is useful however, to note 
that Hammes states that a newer generation of war will trump an earlier, for 
example; if a 3GW force engages a 1GW force, barring other considerations, it 
should win. That is the key element I take from this particular debate; the need to 
consider the type of warfare that each combatant is prepared for. 
 
Thornton further suggests that “4GW is just another term to describe what many a 
soldier has been dealing with for many a year – insurgencies”, before stating that 
the use of the word „warfare‟ to describe 4GW is itself incorrect, as “Insurgencies 
and war are, in many ways, mutually exclusive”. (Thornton 2006, 275) Leaving 
aside the idea that insurgencies are not warfare, and the obvious question of who 
should then fight them, if anyone, 4GW is defined by Hammes as often being an 
 
1 
Email conversation between the author and TX Hammes  – please see Appendix A for full transcript 
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evolved form of insurgency. Insurgencies, like other forms of warfare, have not 
stood still over the last few thousand years; they have evolved and changed to 
better meet their goals. In particular, as Hammes points out, in 4GW “…we no 
longer face monolithic organizations that respond to a single leader and are driven 
by a single concept. Instead, we face coalitions of the willing.” (Hammes 2006, 
282) What can divide 4GW from earlier forms of insurgency is the lack of a unifying 
political idea that drives a cohesive group forwards, instead there are “…coalitions 
of opportunistic groups banded together for the single purpose of ejecting the 
outsider and then defeating the government.” (Hammes 2006, 283) Instead of one 
insurgent group seeking to displace the government and gain power, in 4GW the 
enemy may be a number of loosely affiliated groups that know that once the 
foreign power is expelled, or the government overthrown, they will need to battle 
amongst themselves for power. (This was the nature of the insurgency that 
developed in Iraq.) Therefore COIN techniques can be very useful in fighting 4GW, 
but must be considered in light of the evolutions that insurgency has undertaken in 
4GW. 
 
 
As Frank Hoffman pointed out at the Boyd 2007 Conference in July 2007; “…it is 
now difficult to ignore 4GW. We may quibble with the accuracy or the necessity of 
the generational framework, or the selective historical foundation, but not with 
the need to comprehend and respond to today‟s most common mode of warfare”. 
(Hoffman 2007) Martin Van Creveld states that “In explaining the nature of 4GW, 
Hammes has done us a service. In pointing out that it is going to be the most 
important form of twenty-first-century armed conflict, he is almost certainly 
right.” (Van Creveld 2006, 231) In this work, it is not the exact historical accuracy 
of the idea of generational warfare that I want to examine and quibble over, it is 
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the definition of the type of warfare that the US is preparing for, and engaging in, 
which are not always the same. For this purpose, the definitions provided by 
Hammes of 3GW and 4GW are useful and pertinent. As Hoffman concluded; “Call it 
what you may, 4GW or Complex Irregular or Hybrid Warfare, it presents a mode of 
conflict that severely challenges America‟s conventional military thinking”. 
(Hoffman 2007) 
 
There are those, the denizens of Group 2, who believe that the decision upon which 
type of warfare to focus on has already been made, and that is entirely wrong. 
Colonel Gian Gentile in his 2013 book Wrong Turn: America‟s Deadly Embrace of 
Counter Insurgency, argues that COIN has not worked for the US military, and 
never will stating that “The blunt answer is that hearts-and-minds 
counterinsurgency carried out by an occupying power in a foreign land doesn‟t 
work” although he does add the caveat, “unless it is a multigenerational effort.” 
(Gentile 2013, 128) Commentators such as Gentile, Edward N. Luttwak, and to a 
slightly lesser extent Andrew J. Bacevich, are concerned that the recent 
experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan have led the military leadership to focus too 
strongly on COIN and 4GW type engagements, to the detriment of the fighting 
capabilities of the rest of the military. They do believe that war has changed, and 
that the US is involved in new types of warfare, however they also state that COIN 
does not work, and has never worked, and that therefore the US should stay out of 
such engagements and prepare instead for wars in which the US stands a chance of 
winning. Douglas Porch takes this argument in a slightly different direction, by 
arguing in his 2013 book Counterinsurgency: Exposing the Myths of the New Way 
of War, that COIN and „war amongst the people‟ are merely continuations of a 
particularly savage and colonial style of warfare, in which death and destruction 
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are just as prevalent. COIN is nothing more than another type of brute conquest, 
so although warfare may seem to have changed, it has in fact merely circles back 
to another expression of „the white man‟s burden‟. (Porch 2013) 
 
There is a tacit admission in Gentile‟s book that the 2003 war in Iraq is 4GW and 
COIN, and that the tactics the US military used did not work. (Gentile 2013) He 
also directly contradicts Mary Kaldor, whose work is examined later as part of 
Group 4, in that he states that the separation of Baghdad, amongst others, into 
clearly defined Sunni/Shia areas, helped to stem the violence. In other words, 
separating into ethnic enclaves is what helped, in direct contrast to Kaldor‟s belief 
that this type of separation is harmful. “The third critical factor that worked to 
lower violence was the separation of Baghdad into discrete sectarian districts, 
either Shia or Sunni…” (Gentile 2013, 89) Porch too contradicts Kaldor, in that he 
finds ludicrous and harmful the idea that “…the universal appeal of Western values 
and the transferability of democratic institutions will cause right-thinking non- 
Western peoples to welcome invasion and occupation as a liberation.” (Porch 2012, 
294) Whilst he particularly picks up on Western values not having universal appeal, 
and Kaldor talks more of universally held norms and principles, I would agree more 
with Porch, in that past the basic Maslow Hierarchy of Needs, there are very few 
values that are universally held. 
 
Gentile is not alone in calling for clearer strategy, although he expressly links 
failure in warfare to a lack of clear strategy at the top, stating that; “When a state 
gets its strategy right in war, tactical problems tend to be subsumed and improved 
within it.” (Gentile 2012,117) He examines the reaction to Vietnam for lessons, 
and concludes: “For the United States, the essential lesson from Vietnam is that 
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the crucial elements in war are not smarter counterinsurgency tactics, better 
generals, or more malleable popular support, but clear-headed thinking about 
policy and strategy that aligns ways, means, and ends relative to national interests 
and the potential of our enemies.” (Gentile 2012, 83) He seems personally 
offended at the „saviour general‟ idea in particular, and dogmatically insists that 
right from the start the US military was employing COIN tactics in Iraq, to little 
effect. Whilst accepting that warfare has changed to varying degrees, Group 2 
commentators argue that the US should not become involved in the new types of 
war, and should instead bolster conventional war fighting capabilities to enable 
the US to take on the next evenly-matched super power. Luttwak agrees, openly 
stating that “To refocus military resources on 4GW would be especially 
unfortunate for the US. … The US is good at destroying objects and armed forces 
that assemble into conveniently targetable mass formations. … We should remain 
focused on global strategy to preserve the imbalance of military strength that 
dissuades Great Power competition, leaving terrorists to police forces and staying 
clear of insurgencies.” (Luttwak 2006, 228) 
 
Scholars in Group 2 tend to be also be those who argue for the US to spend more of 
the defence budget on improved and newer technology, as dominance through 
technological superiority is usually seen as an important aspect of still being able 
to win „conventional‟ wars. This includes the use of technology to create better 
networks, and of course building some sort of „system of systems‟ that would help 
eliminate the fog of war from the battlefield. In the 1990s, as the information age 
possibilities permeated most areas of academic discourse about the character of 
warfare, the idea of net-centric warfare (NCW) came into vogue. As Shimko points 
out “Net-centric warfare is the system of systems.” (Shimko 2010, 114) Two men 
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are usually credited with advancing the ideas of NCW: Admiral William Owens and 
Admiral Arthur Cebrowski. By the end of the 1990s and start of the 2000s, NCW had 
become an accepted part of the RMA. Much space was given to the idea of 
“…power derived from the strong networking of a well-informed but geographically 
dispersed force.” (Cebrowski and Gartska, 1998) 
 
The problem with this view is that although the networks have certainly developed 
and been of use to the US military, there is still no „system of systems‟ that can 
coordinate every aspect of the battlefield across all forces to remove the fog of 
war. Aside from the lack of technology able to accomplish this, the structure of 
the US military does not support this, and even if these rather large obstacles were 
to be overcome, a „system of systems‟ would still have been of very limited use in 
the Iraq War of 2003, for example, after the initial 3GW phases. Technological 
superiority cannot substitute for manpower and skill, despite the hopeful thinking 
of those who yearn for warfare through machines, with no human causalities, at 
least not on the US side. Still, concerned about a future in which another 
superpower can gain dominance through outclassing the US with technological 
advances, proponents in Group 2 clamour for better jets, improved technology 
networks, and ever more technological munitions advantages. 
 
Moving onto Group 3, those who argue that the US military will have to become a 
multi-headed hydra capable of delivering all things to all people, and that the US 
needs to be ready for anything. This has encountered obvious resistance in the 
form of budgetary restrictions, limited manpower, and the urge to specialise 
rather than risk mediocre performance across a range of tasks. 
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In the 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review, the then Secretary of Defense William 
Cohen predicted that MOOTW would come to dominate the military‟s future 
missions. (Shimko 2010, 105) This raised a fundamental question that continues to 
affect military thinking, planning, and critique to this day. Is it preferable, is it 
even possible, to have a military that can excel at all forms of warfare, and 
MOOTW? MOOTW tend to be manpower intensive, long term, and involve a very 
wide range of tasks and therefore skills. Can the same forces be used to protect 
human rights, set up civilian police forces, protect and shelter refugees, AND 
 
engage in high-tech high-firepower wars against a highly armed and mechanized 
enemy? This debate has recently come to another head in the debate around the 
Iraq War and the lessons to be learnt from the engagement. There are those, such 
as Porch and Gentile as referenced previously, who argue that COIN does not work, 
and that restructuring and training the US military to focus on such warfare is 
dangerous, as it will dilute the valuable skills needed to engage in inter-state war 
against an opponent of similar scope and power to the US. (Most likely, China.) 
Harking back two decades and more to the intervention in Somalia, commentators 
such as these argue that the US has no role to play in nation building or being the 
world‟s policeman, and should not engage in MOOTW. 
 
Thomas P.M Barnett is one of the theorists who argues that the US does need 
abilities across all spectrums, but that creating an all-purpose military force able 
to excel across core competencies in everything is impossible. He argues for the 
creation of two forces; one to wage war and one to wage peace. (Shimko 2010, 
230) Plans for this have been critiqued by John A. Nagl and David Kilcullen, 
amongst others, and have never been more than vague. The thinking that leads to 
calls for the US military to compete in any arena is clearly based on a fear that the 
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wrong type of war is being prepared for, and prioritised. Unable to look to the 
future and plan for the types of wars the US will engage in, commentators call for 
the US to ready for anything, at any time. As Andrew F. Krepinevich pointed out 
before the U.S Senate Armed Services Committee “...the Army‟s leadership has 
rightly concluded that it needs a force capable of performing across the full 
spectrum of conflict at a high level of effectiveness. But in its attempts to become 
equally effective across a range of conflict types, it risks becoming marginally 
competent in many tasks, and highly effective at none.”  In short, although writers 
from the Economist to book authors to politicians have called for a multi- 
functional army, due to the constraints of reality, the question of what type of 
warfare the US will engage in is still one that needs to be answered for the US to 
effectively plan its force capabilities. 
 
The commentators in Group 4 would argue that the role of the military has 
 
changed to the extent that the future of the armed forces is in MOOTW. This would 
be a huge departure for the role of the military; an armed force that is usually 
expressly set up to wage wars, either offensive or defensive, for the preservation 
of the society to which it belongs. It is worth noting the very important truism at 
this point: although the types and methods of warfare may have changed, war 
itself, as a fundamental concept, has not. In short, war is still, and remains, 
organized violence waged and/or threatened to achieve a political aim. All the 
advances, all the „generations‟ of warfare from 1GW through to 4GW have not 
altered the fundamental nature of war. As Rupert Smith points out, a failure to 
understand this leads to force being expended without utility. (Smith, 2003) War is 
still the use of violence for political purposes, and whilst the character of the war 
may change, whilst technology and tactics improve, and the manner in which war 
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is waged may be subject to significant, even revolutionary change, the essential 
nature of what war is does not alter. 
 
Mary Kaldor, in the 2012 Third Edition of her book, New and Old Wars: Organized 
 
Violence in a Global Era, asserts that inter-state war is becoming an 
anachronism, and that international peacekeeping should become cosmopolitan 
law enforcement. She sees warfare as having changed, but draws a remarkably 
different conclusion to Hammes. I would place Kaldor in Group 4, as she states that 
“The new type of warfare is a predatory social condition.” (Kaldor 2012, 113) She 
draws a distinction between the „old wars‟ which were mainly between nation 
states, often over geo-political boundaries, and the „new wars‟ which are a mix of 
war, organised crime, and massive violations of human rights. Those who are 
injured the most, who are disenfranchised the most, who suffer the most, are 
civilians, and this is deliberate. The antagonists attempt to create a climate of 
hate and fear, upon which their power rests. (Kaldor 2012) 
 
Whilst sharing some similarities with COIN, the „new wars‟ concept also has some 
key differences. “Instead of a favourable environment for the guerrilla, the new 
warfare aims to create an unfavourable environment for all those people it cannot 
control.” (Kaldor 2012, 104) So unlike revolutionary war and insurgency, this type 
of warfare does not attempt to create support amongst the people as much as it 
tries to simply eliminate any lack of support or resistance. It could be argued that 
this is less hearts and minds than it is fear and hate. Ideology has also lost its 
important place and is no longer key. In revolutionary war, revolutionaries tried to 
build model societies in areas under their control. Now “new warriors establish 
political control through allegiance to a label rather than an idea”. (Kaldor 2012, 
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103) The „labels‟ that Kaldor refers to are linked to her idea that identity politics, 
both local and global, and making use of the new technologies, are used by those 
seeking to grasp and hold power. Hence the calls for people to be loyal to a „label‟ 
rather than an idea, and the fostering of hatred towards those of a different 
„label‟. (Kaldor 2012, 8) 
 
 
Sheehan broadly agrees with Kaldor on the „new war‟ type, although he defines 
them as „postmodern‟ instead, stating: 
 
“The purpose and objectives of armed conflict are also changing. Modern 
wars originated in the pursuit of perceived national interest. Wars tended to 
be driven by geopolitical assumptions, such as those fought in defence of 
the balance of power. Postmodern wars are often focused on „identity 
politics‟. Power is pursued on the basis of a particular identity. These wars 
may break out in an effort to pursue ethnic cleansing, or religiously inspired 
holy war. Such conflicts are often particularly ferocious, and may not have 
clearly defined beginnings and endings, but they are however, no less 
political. … 
 
 
… Postmodern non-state institutions of violence tend to draw material 
sustenance not from such formal and centralized national economies and 
defence industries, but from private production and finance networks 
organised either locally or on a global scale. Such sources may include 
plunder and theft, hostage-taking for ransom, extortion, drug trafficking, 
arms trafficking, money laundering, remittances and material support from 
relevant diaspora communities, foreign assistance, and the diversion of 
humanitarian aid. For many of the combatants, such wars are an end in 
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themselves, they are „military entrepreneurs‟ exploiting a new form of „war 
economy‟.” (64) 
 
He agrees with Kaldor on the new economic structure of the „new wars‟, pointing 
out that in a globalised environment, profit from war can be a valid reason to 
prolong it for those making the money. 
 
Kaldor defines the most recent wars in Iraq and Afghanistan as „new wars‟, and 
goes on to state: “Wars in Iraq and Afghanistan are good illustrations of the way in 
which misperceptions about the character of war exacerbate „new wars‟” (Kaldor 
2012, 12) In particular, the mistaken belief that technology can substitute for 
manpower, and that the best way to examine the situation was through tribal and 
ethnic lenses. She goes on to argue that the responses to these new wars are in 
general unhelpful at best, actively harmful at worst. By holding talks with those 
with guns, by de facto agreeing to the breakdown and fragmentation of society 
along „tribal‟ or „ethnie‟ lines, the UN and others legitimatises the warlords. She 
calls instead for a cosmopolitan approach, which would see international 
peacekeeping reconceptualised as cosmopolitan law enforcement. She calls for 
women‟s groups, civil leaders, and „zones of civility‟ to be included in the talks, 
just as much, if not in preference to, the warlords. For the purposes of this 
examination of warfare, Kaldor sees the role of the military as shifting very clearly 
and definitely away from warfare, and that it should be set up for MOOTW, in this 
case, „cosmopolitan law enforcement‟. (Kaldor 2012) 
 
I am unfavourably struck by Kaldor‟s assertion. Whilst it is true that for the last 
 
few decades especially, the role of the military has expanded greatly, and includes 
international search and rescue missions, peacekeeping, and reconstruction work, 
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the idea of a military not set up for warfare in one form or another, that individual 
nation states, which do still exist, are happy to fund is hard to conceive of. In 
particular, when Kaldor argues that “Respect for international principles and legal 
norms…” (Kaldor 2012, 121) should be paramount, and that this political 
mobilization needs to “…override other considerations – geo-politics or short-term 
domestic concerns; it has to constitute the primary guide to policy and action…” 
(Kaldor 2012, 121), this is hopelessly doomed in the current global reality in which 
we exist and wars are waged. Not least due to the fact that although globalisation 
is a strong force for change, we are very far away from having internationally 
agreed principles and legal norms, as even a cursory examination of one issue such 
as gender rights will show. 
 
Returning to Group 1, which includes Kilcullen, Nagl, and Hammes amongst others, 
and has been vocal since the Vietnam War. They posit that the US has been, and 
will continue to be involved in what are often termed „irregular wars‟, „low 
intensity combat‟, and COIN. Starting with Vietnam, moving on to Somalia, and 
now most recently into Iraq, they also point out that these are the only types of 
war in which the US cannot seem to win a decisive victory. Unlike Gentile 
however, they do not call for a retreat from this type of warfare, but for a better 
understanding of it and the use of improved tactics to counter it. 
 
The defining characteristic of this warfare is that victory is no longer sought 
through defeating the enemy's military forces, but is instead sought through 
directly targeting the enemy's political will, through all available channels and 
networks. Although targeting political will is neither a new tactic, nor a unique 
one, its prominence in 4GW marks the latest generation of warfare as different 
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from the previous generations. In conversation with Hammes he confirmed that; 
“My contention is that the idea of attacking the will of the enemy decision makers 
is key to 4GW. The increasing type and variety of networks are useful tools for 
executing that intent but are not essential. But the caveat is that it will not work 
if the defeat means the destruction of the government accepting the defeat. 
That's why it works to drive out outside powers…”2  This is similar to Nagl‟s 
 
assertion regarding COIN: “Now defeating the army required that the people be 
defeated as well…” (Nagl 2005, 25). 
 
When the US entered Iraq in 2003 it started off engaged in a 3GW war, one in 
which it enjoyed great success. However, after the end of conventional hostilities, 
the US become embroiled in 4GW, and as Hammes points out, 4GW “works best for 
defeating an outside power that is not at existential risk.”3  This has been the 
situation the US has placed itself in places such as Vietnam, in Somalia, and in 
Iraq. The US‟s existence has never been at risk, and they have continually been the 
outside power entering into another country with all the interrelated dynamics 
that involves. For this reason, those in Group 1 see the development of tactics to 
succeed in this type of environment as key for the US‟s future success in warfare. 
 
Kilcullen puts forward an amended “Twenty-eight Articles” for COIN warfare in his 
 
2010 book Counterinsurgency, based on an article that went viral in 2006 amongst 
Coalition forces in Iraq. He argues that “Insurgency is the most widespread form of 
warfare today…mastering its techniques, pitfalls, and lessons – is, and will remain 
for the foreseeable future, a vital activity.” (Kilcullen 2010, ix) Nagl makes a 
similar argument in his revised 2005 book; Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: 
 
 
 
2 
Ibid. Please see Appendix A for full transcript. 
3 
Ibid. Please see Appendix A for full transcript. 
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Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam, in which he states that 
 
„irregular warfare‟ is predominant, and the ability to counter it must be 
developed. 
 
When looking for a testing ground to prove whether Group 1 or Group 2 have the 
right idea, the obvious proving ground would seem to be Vietnam. However to see 
the differences between high-tech high-intensity, and more 4GW methods, the 
better contrast would be the first Gulf War and the intervention in Somalia, more 
recent conflicts that have shown the strengths and weaknesses of both 
approaches. 
 
Those who believed that a RMA had occurred saw the epitome of this new mode of 
warfare in the first Gulf War of 1990  – 1991. In this war the US brought huge 
technological superiority to bear, including complete air dominance, and won a 
war with negligible US losses in comparison to the Iraqis. In Keith L. Shimko‟s 2010 
book; The Iraq Wars and America‟s Military Revolution, he spends considerable 
time exploring the concept of a „revolution‟, and what would define such an event 
in military terms. Whilst not going into such depth here, it will suffice to say that 
“All agree that RMAs are characterized by significant changes in the conduct of 
warfare.” (Shimko 2010, 21) For those who had proposed that a RMA was underway 
in the US military, related to increased technological abilities and better-than-ever 
abilities to penetrate the fog of war, the Gulf War seemed an apt testing ground. 
 
Early indications led to the Gulf War being hailed as a success for Group 2. Reports 
from the Coalition air bombardment stated that “ “Unable to attack or retreat in 
the face of Coalition air power,” Iraqi troops “could only hunker down and 
continue to suffer mounting punishment, both physical and psychological, from the 
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air.” By the conclusion of the land war, coalition forces had to deal with the 
unexpected problem of thousands of POWs who preferred surrender to fighting. 
Interviews testified to the impact of bombing and the lack of basic supplies such as 
food and water, especially for the frontline units. …as a result “the impact of 
these strikes on the morale of the average soldier on the ground was immense.”” 
(Shimko 2012, 75) 
 
The first Gulf War was brought to an end exactly 100 hours after Coalition ground 
forces initiated the ground attack that followed the heavy aerial bombardment. It 
was a tremendous military success for the US. However, could it truly be said to be 
an indication that the US had evolved an unbeatable military force, ready to face a 
new type of warfare? The victory was celebrated as one over a determined, 
resourceful, and well-equipped foe; a new type of war which the US would win. 
Shimko argues however that this victory was not one of the “unexpectedly lopsided 
victories” that serve as “possible harbingers of military revolution”. (Shimko 2010, 
77) Although the Iraq Army had been built up and touted as the “third largest army 
in the world” (Berkowitz), with experienced leaders and battle hardened soldiers, 
making this the “most successful campaign in U.S. military history” (Citino), others 
refer to the war as a battle between a “minor military power” going head to head 
with the “world‟s sole superpower”. (Keaney and Cohen) (Shimko 2010, 77-78) 
 
In Desert Storm, the US forces faced the exact type of enemy that they had been 
preparing to fight for nearly a decade. Of course it had been anticipated that the 
troops would be Soviet, not Iraqi, but fundamentally the high-tech high-firepower 
Desert Storm war was one that the US was superbly ready to face. The US had the 
targeting capability, the precision weapons, and the warfare mostly took part far 
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away from large civilian populations, where it was easy to recognize the enemy 
and separate combatants from non-combatants. Success in this war, especially 
against an enemy, that whilst fighting the same type of war, had substantially 
inferior technology and firepower, should have been a given. It was not proof that 
the US had evolved the capability to win a new type of war, as was clearly shown 
just two years later when the US intervened in Somalia. 
 
At the time there were questions raised about what had gone wrong for the US 
military in Somalia. Barely two years after US forces had won a stunning victory 
against an army touted as the third largest in the world, with talk of putting the 
spectre of Vietnam to rest at last, those same forces had been humiliatingly 
defeated by a small force of fighters armed with relatively primitive weapons. 
Whilst the size and commitment aspect is an easy excuse to focus on (hundreds of 
thousands of troops for Desert Storm, less than five thousand for the Battle of 
Mogadishu (Shimko 2010)), this is not the only reason for the turnaround in US 
success. 
 
Andrew Bacevich writing in 1993 was not alone in pointing out that the difference 
between the two confrontations was a clear cut example of one enemy playing to 
the US‟s strengths, and the other playing to its weaknesses. In Somalia, the US 
faced a type of warfare that negated their advantages; as in Iraq in 2003, the US 
forces would find their technological and firepower advantages countered. Whilst I 
think it is doubtful that General Mohamed Farrah Hassan Aidid deliberately refused 
to engage in high-tech warfare, not least because he simply did not have access to 
the technology, and certainly not the budget of the US, the warfare he engaged in 
did refuse to play to US strengths. Urban warfare, in which the fighting takes place 
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in centres of high civilian, non-combatant density, and in which it is impossible to 
determine enemy combatant from non-combatant, drastically reduced the 
effectiveness of the US forces. Despite their targeting and precision weapon 
capabilities, no bomb was, or is, yet smart enough to determine exactly who in a 
crowded building is an enemy, and detonate to kill only those, leaving untouched 
the civilians amongst whom the enemy is hiding, and leaving undamaged the 
civilian infrastructure of the city. This problem, first seen in Somalia in 1993, was 
not addressed before the US entered Iraq in 2003. The start of the Iraq War in 2003 
played to the strengths of the US forces, just as it had in the Gulf War. However, 
the urban warfare, the guerrilla warfare, the „war amongst the people‟ that the US 
 
had lost in Vietnam, and in Somalia, once again defeated the US in Iraq in 2003. 
 
 
In examining the impact of Somalia and the “Black Hawk Down” effect on US 
foreign policy, Shimko states that “The concept of “nation building” became 
almost toxic in discussions of American foreign and defense policy for a decade. 
Somalia raised concerns about committing American forces to ill-defined missions 
without clear exit strategies, echoing the Weinberger and Powell doctrines.” 
(Shimko 2010, 102) We can see how this carried through to the 2003 Iraq War, 
when Bush and his cabinet were very clear from the start that they did not intend 
to be a part of any nation building. Rumsfeld was a believer in the RMA and the 
technological aspects of the same, and he too made it clear that he thought 
American forces were not there to build bridges etc. (Rumsfeld 2011) What those 
in power should have learnt from Somalia however was not that „nation building‟ 
per se was unsuitable for American forces, but that their well-equipped, 
technologically advanced military had obvious weaknesses when facing the type of 
rag tag militia faced in Somalia, and then later in Iraq. 
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It is interesting to note that those in the administration preparing for the 2003 Iraq 
 
War were clearly proponents of the RMA, and would fall into Group 2. We can 
easily see how clearly Bush and Rumsfeld supported the idea of the RMA that had 
been in circulation by examining their statements about the future of the US 
military as they foresaw it. Bush, in a September 1999 speech at the Citadel 
military academy stated the following as part of his talk: 
 
“Power is increasingly defined, not by mass or size, but by mobility and swiftness. 
Influence is measured in information, safety is gained in stealth, and force is 
projected on the long arc of precision-guided weapons…Our military must be able 
to identify targets…Then be able to destroy those targets almost instantly…” (Bush 
1999) 
 
 
In Rumsfeld‟s talks and speeches, and later on in his memoirs, he too spoke of his 
military revolution as being fundamentally about creating light, lethal, mobile, and 
smaller military forces. (Rumsfeld 2011) He also saw the bureaucracy and 
leadership of the military itself as standing in the way of the RMA being fully 
realized. As Group 2 believers that this „revolution‟, based in the main on 
technological superiority giving the edge over all enemies, Bush and Rumsfeld 
relied upon their 3GW ready troops to win the war in Iraq in 2003, with the 
minimum of men, time, and casualties. 
 
In planning for the Iraq War in 2003, a very essential point about the RMA, and 
Group 2 thinking in general, seems to have been completely overlooked by the 
planners. “The RMA was about a revolution in warfare, not postwar stabilization.” 
(Shimko 201, 145) What is absolutely key to understand is that to look at the RMA 
as having completely transformed all types of warfare, and MOOTW, against all 
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types of opponents, and in all terrains and every situation, is to vastly over-inflate 
the impact of the RMA. As the US should have learnt from the Somalia debacle, the 
RMA only gave an advantage in the warfare it had been designed for. It did not 
mean, as Wolfowitz and others seemed to think, that the US military could now 
accomplish absolutely anything with dramatically reduced troop numbers. Nation 
building, post war stabilization, COIN; all of these, and all of the MOOTW, could 
not be accomplished through the RMA. They still require „boots on the ground‟, 
long term engagements measured in decades not weeks and months, and troop 
numbers far above what the US military needs to win an interstate war against a 
vastly inferior opponent. 
 
The RMA methods showed success in the early days of the 2003 Iraq War. Whilst in 
 
1991 the US military had been unable to effectively fight in sandstorm conditions, 
improvements in technology meant that in 2003 the airpower the US could bring to 
bear was actually most heavily used during the 3 day sandstorm that started on 
March 25th. (Shimko 201, 154) Whilst ground troops rested, the air bombardment 
was relentless. As a result “…large portions of the Iraqi Army simply shed their 
uniforms and melted away, leaving the battlefield and taking their weapons with 
them.” (Shimko 201, 155) Here I would argue that RMA and 3GW tactics were 
helping to win the initial engagement, whilst sowing the seeds for the insurgency 
and civil war later. The US military was amply able to demonstrate that they had 
air dominance, technological superiority, and could strike the massed formations 
of the Iraqi Army at will, even whilst the Iraqis were forced to hunker down and 
wait out a sandstorm. In the face of this, it made sense for many Iraqis to take 
heed of the leaflets dropped and desert, which helped secure a quick victory for 
the US. However the RMA did not cover how to deal with these armed, trained, 
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fighters once the initial engagement was satisfactorily concluded, and this is where 
the US tipped from success to defeat, as the war became 4GW in nature. 
 
It is clear that the US military, in common with militaries around the globe, is 
increasingly having to cope with ever more varied demands upon its resources. It is 
common sense then to look at where the highest demand is likely to be, and 
structure the force to meet that effectively. In doing so the thoughts on the future 
of warfare can be discerned. The US military that entered Iraq in 2003 was 
superbly equipped to cope with the initial phase of the war, which was, depending 
up on the definition you prefer, either a classic example of 3GW, or the epitome of 
the RMA. When it came to targeting the political will of the enemy however, and 
attacking the will of the enemy decision makers, the US was incredibly 
unprepared. An assumption that the RMA models that allowed fewer troops to win 
wars would also allow fewer troops to win peace, and the reluctance of the 
administration to engage in „nation building‟, drastically reduced the effectiveness 
of the force that was sent to Iraq. Once the 3GW part of the war was over, the 
technological superiority did not prove to be the decisive edge the US needed. The 
US became engaged in war amongst the people; war in which the enemy hid 
amongst, and was often sheltered by the civilians, urban warfare in which the 
enemy never massed to be shot at, and in which the engagement would be slow 
and painful. The US entered into 4GW as Hammes describes it, and was woefully 
underprepared. 
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Chapter Two: Holes in the Plans 
 
 
 
 
“No one starts a war--or rather, no one in his senses ought to do so--without first 
being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by that war and how he intends 
to conduct it.” Carl von Clausewitz. (Clausewitz 1989, 579) 
 
 
 
I have already touched on the views of Donald Rumsfeld and President George W. 
Bush, in as much as these pertained to a favourable view of the RMA. Given the 
fondness in the administration, and parts of the military, to tout the benefits of a 
high-tech force able to win wars in the minimum amount of time, and with the 
minimum numbers needed, it can be no surprise that in planning for the 2003 Iraq 
War, these ideas coloured the entirety of the planning. The US failed both of the 
factors set out by Clausewitz as precursors for a sensible start to warfare. Firstly, 
the overall strategic aims were not well thought out. Secondly, fundamental 
misunderstandings about the nature of the war that was to be engaged in led to 
incorrect assumptions about how it could be conducted. The administration, 
buoyed by the hopes of a similar victory to the 1991 Gulf War, planned for a 
relentlessly 3GW war; a war in which the RMA would provide the edge needed to 
succeed once again. As a result, at the cease of „conventional‟ hostilities that 
played to US military strengths, the US military force ceased to have utility, and as 
it floundered, opened the gates for a 4GW insurgency to develop. 
 
 
 
There are three particular points to note, which will be investigated in this 
chapter. Firstly, there is the lack of clear intelligence gathered on Iraq. In any 
war, disaster resulting from a failure to gather intelligence and plan properly 
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would not be surprising, however I do discern some unique attributes within this 
failure. The belief in the RMA having created a US force that could penetrate the 
fog of war as never before, and succeed in battle with far fewer numbers than 
previously considered feasible, led to false assumptions about the capabilities of 
the US military to win ANY engagement, not just one that played to their 
strengths, and downplayed the importance of the lack of intelligence that had 
been gathered regarding Iraq. Intelligence regarding the Iraqi people, society, and 
infrastructure was drastically lacking, and without this there was no way to target 
Iraqi political will to support the US goal of a democratic Iraq, or even a 
recognition that this would be necessary. 
 
 
 
Secondly, the spaces between the administration and military focus. The 
disconnect between the military and the civil administration can perhaps best be 
summarised as a difference in goals. The US military had a goal defined by a 
negative: the removal of Saddam Hussein. The administration by contrast quickly 
moved their public goal after no WMDs were found to a positive: the liberation of 
Iraq into a democracy. They failed to work with each other to determine 
responsibilities for each phase and a clear transition from one to the other, 
including a hand over from military control to civilian. Due to this, the first aim 
was achieved, and the second immediately and unconsciously sabotaged from 
within. In the space between these aims lies the gaping hole of a lack of unified 
cross-directorate post-war planning. 
 
 
 
Finally, the lack of 4GW style planning, including handovers, post-conflict stages, 
and psywar aspects relating to democracy promotion. Dangerous assumptions were 
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made by the Bush administration about the reception that US forces would receive 
and the existing circumstances of the Iraqi people and state infrastructure. As 
discussed previously in Chapter One, the US administration eschewed „nation 
building‟ and protracted engagements. Hence the plans for Iraq to become a 
democracy were hardly worthy of the name, seemingly based on the hope that Iraq 
would embrace Western style democracy without a concerted campaign to 
convince them to do so being needed. To create a democratic government involves 
harnessing the support of the population, targeting their political will to support 
it. If the US had recognised that the situation in Iraq could become a 4GW 
engagement, or at the very least that the 3GW stage would not achieve a 
democratic Iraq, the aim of creating a democracy could have been expressed in 
4GW terms. As they failed to do so, they failed to adequately plan and resource to 
meet this goal. The US did not plan for 4GW, started pursuing elements of it late, 
and did so badly. The failure to plan directly led to the growth of a networked 
insurgency past the initial conflict stages. This chapter will examine the pre-war 
planning and the immediate post-conflict actions to show that the US failed to plan 
past the 3GW stage of the war, and thus started to sow the seeds of their own 
defeat once the 4GW phase started. 
 
 
 
Some notable figures in the administration of President George W. Bush, namely 
Paul Wolfowitz (US Deputy Secretary of Defense), Richard Perle (chairman of the 
Defense Policy Board), and Donald Rumsfield (US Secretary of Defense)4, are the 
personalities that I would argue Joseph Nye describes when he refers to “a group 
 
 
 
4 
Signatories to a 1998 letter from the Project for the New American Centre (PNAC) to President Clinton calling 
for the removal of Saddam Hussein, a call they repeated to President George W. Bush on September 20
th 
2011. 
(Roston 2008) 
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of people within the Administration, who came into power and looked at American 
military preeminence, [and] devised the view… called „the new unilateralism:‟ 
that the United States is so powerful that we can do as we wish and others have no 
choice but to follow. They have used that view as a way of applying American 
military power to all sorts of problems.” (Nye 2002) These neo-conservatives and 
associates saw military might as the deciding factor in conflicts. This method of 
approaching conflict is rooted in 3GW and a belief in the RMA, and the tactics 
employed are completely unsuited to the more dynamic, media-centric, and 
globally connected 4GW type of engagement. (Hammes 2006) 
 
 
 
Within the administration Wolfowitz and Douglas Feith, noted neo-conservative 
hawks, set up the Office of Special Plans (OSP) in September 2002, which quickly 
became the main source for President George W. Bush of “raw” intelligence from 
Iraq. (Allawi 2007; Galbraith 2006) The traditional intelligence community 
operatives, still reeling from the failure to prevent 9/11, did not have the strength 
to argue that their customary caveat-hedged reports were factually accurate 
although not as dramatic as would have been preferred. Within the OSP 
information was gathered and sifted to bolster a view of Saddam as ready and able 
to deploy or sell WMD, but weak militarily and liable to crumble due to lack of 
popular support5. 
 
 
 
Ahmed Chalabi has been termed “the man who pushed America to war”. (Galbraith 
 
2006; Roston 2008) As part of the Iraqi National Congress, Chalabi was welcome on 
 
 
5 
In 2007 the Department of Defense Office of Inspector General produced a report in which the role of the 
OSP was examined, and whilst the conclusion was that the actions of this group were not “illegal or 
unauthorised”, they were “inappropriate given that the intelligence assessments were intelligence products 
and did not clearly show the variance with the consensus of the Intelligence Community”. (DoD OoIG 2007) 
38  
Capitol Hill, and particularly amongst the neo-conservatives such as The Project for 
the New American Century (PNAC) whose ideas for the US‟s place on the world 
stage would prove useful to him. Chalabi had long enjoyed US government support, 
proving useful to anyone who wanted to hear about an alternative to Saddam. Even 
President Clinton, hardly a neo-conservative, supported him during his tenure. 
(Ryan 2010) Chalabi, personally and through his networks, painted a picture of an 
Iraq before Saddam that had been tolerant of many creeds and cultures, and ripe 
for democracy, an Iraq that could exist again after U.S help to remove the obstacle 
of Saddam. (Roston, 2008) An image perhaps rose tinted through the lens of 
nostalgia. 
 
 
 
Believing the claims of Chalabi and others led the planning down the track of a 
relatively easy „liberation‟. This type of regime change would only stand a chance 
if the head could be amputated and the body survive a transplant; it assumed that 
the functions of the state and infrastructure could continue under new leadership. 
As existing exercises had already shown, Iraq was neither unified nor ready to 
undergo a peaceful transition to a democratic government, and information on the 
infrastructure was wholly inadequate. 
 
 
 
The over confidence regarding the ease of winning a war against Saddam was not 
dented by “Desert Crossing”; a 1999 war games exercise led by General Anthony 
Zinni, running the scenarios envisaged to occur in the event that the US went into 
Iraq to topple Saddam Hussein. The Desert Crossing exercise was pessimistic in its 
assumptions: it stated that a democratic government was not a feasible goal, 
aggressive neighbours and internal strife could lead to a protracted civil war, and 
39  
estimating a minimum required number of 400,000 US troops. In the slides created 
in 1999 to sum up the exercise, the conclusions were that the “ending of military 
intervention does not mean end of engagement” (Secret: Desert Crossing Seminar: 
After Action Report Briefing, July 22nd 1999, Slide 186), that “the development of a 
Pol-Mil plan should begin immediately”(Ibid., slide 20), and that “a lack of 
information on internal Iraqi opposition conditions severely hampers contingency 
planning”(Ibid., slide 22). 
 
 
 
The Desert Crossing Exercise has of course been proved correct in many of its 
assumptions; it was a well thought out exercise that could have been very useful to 
US war planners. It showed a 3GW style engagement alone would not be sufficient. 
General Zinni‟s question to Central Command during the pre-war phase; “Are you 
guys looking at Desert Crossing?”, and their reply of “What‟s that?” (Ricks 2003) 
have been quoted in numerous articles, showing that the exercise and the 
conclusions it drew were not heeded. Apart from the specific advice regarding 
troop numbers and the potential of a fragmented Iraq further destabilising the 
region, the Desert Crossing conclusions and the general tone of the report 
emphasised the importance of cross-directorate working and multiple agency 
planning, highlighting that the military could not be expected to fulfil all roles 
relating to humanitarian and reconstruction work7. This advice was ignored in the 
pre-war planning phases, as the Coalition Provisional Agency (CPA) was only set up 
in one location, Baghdad, as opposed to the minimum of 18 areas that Zinni et al 
had proposed. 
 
 
 
 
6 
Please see Appendix  B for a copy of the slides 
7 
Please see Appendix C for a copy of the report 
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Desert Crossing was not the only resource that the planners in the administration 
discounted. As Ricks argues in his book, “It wasn‟t that there was no planning. On 
the contrary, there was a lot…But much of the planning was shoddy, there was no 
one really in charge of it, and there was little coordination between the various 
groups.”  (Ricks 2006, 79) Plans in existence included the Future of Iraq Project, 
Desert Crossing, plans from Central Command, and the infamously incoherent Joint 
Task Force IV power point slides to name a few. For example, the Future of Iraq 
Project from 2001 onwards, although often chaotic in organisation and poor in 
recommendations, did point out numerous issues that could arise in a post-Saddam 
Iraq, but was not widely recognised as a valid base for post-war planning. 
(Diamond 2005) 
 
 
 
 
Without one person, or even one department taking overall responsibility for the 
post- war planning, strategy became fragmented. Concurrent with the planning for 
the Iraq war, Rumsfeld was in addition attempting to transform the Department of 
Defense and the military along the lines of the RMA. (Rumsfeld 2011) The conflict 
in Afghanistan was also taking its toll, particularly affecting the ability of Central 
Command (CentCom) and top level military thinkers and planners to combine their 
efforts to create a post war plan for Iraq. Domestic concerns around finances and 
troop numbers also clouded judgement about the amount of troops needed to be 
engaged, with Rumsfeld insisting on reducing the troop number estimate given to 
him by CentCom. (Rumsfeld 2011) 
 
 
 
The lack of information regarding the internal situation in Iraq extended beyond 
internal Iraqi opposition conditions; there was in general a lack of intelligence 
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regarding basic information on the Iraqi infrastructure, psychological conditions of 
the populace, many of whom had grown up knowing only Saddam‟s rule and 
hearing only his misinformation, and economic stability. It was assumed that the 
Iraqi civilian infrastructure had almost completely recovered from the previous 
military engagements, when in fact the power plants and numerous other essential 
parts of the civilian infrastructure were in a state of constant cannibalisation to 
continue operating, and required urgent large scale investment and refurbishment. 
No plans were put in place to secure these installations and no budget was set 
aside for their continued operation. (Chandrasekaran 2006) Also lacking in the 
considerations was the true psychological state of the Iraqi populace, who had 
endured Saddam‟s rule for 24 years. During that time Saddam had consciously 
worked to create a state of fear and mistrust within the general populace as well 
as his own party; with children encouraged to inform on their parents, mock trials 
and executions, disappearances, tortures, and an informant network that was 
believed to have spread so wide and so deep that people no longer felt 
comfortable openly expressing their true thoughts and emotions. Iraqis had learnt 
to mistrust information, to look for the hidden meaning in communications and 
actions, and keep a tight rein on any dissenting thoughts and actions. (al-Khalil 
1989) In such circumstances it was naive to expect people to throw off their mental 
shackles and line the streets cheering their „liberators‟ as soon as they arrived, 
however this expectation was allowed to percolate through the pre-war planning 
without serious challenge. This mistaken belief regarding the welcome for US 
troops in Iraq filtered down right from the top, with Vice-President Cheney stating 
in an NBC interview just before the war that “...the people of Iraq...will welcome 
us as liberators.” (Galbraith 2006, 87) 
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On the other hand, while there is no doubt that Iraqis had suffered under Saddam‟s 
rule, with his use of terror and complete dominance, often neglected in the 
strategic thinking was the fact that Iraq as a whole had actually enjoyed increased 
prosperity and development simultaneously with this terror. (Chandrasekaran 
2006, 123) The literacy rate of the populace had shot up from 0.5% in the last 
years of Ottoman rule, to 18.3% in 1957 to over 50% by the early 1980s, (al-Khalil 
1989, 85).  Women had gained more rights relative to their position in the tribal 
and familial hierarchies pre-Saddam (although it could be argued that women had 
gained power relative to the traditional male hierarchies only through ceding that 
power instead to the state), and the state ensured almost full employment. These 
developments bolstered Saddam‟s power, however, they also improved living 
conditions and wealth for most Iraqis, although the main beneficiaries were of 
course Sunnis. Under his dictatorship, factions and divisions within Iraqi society 
were forced to work as a roughly cohesive whole; tensions still existed between 
different religious and ethnic groups, but they were never allowed to bubble over 
into anything resembling a civil war. Saddam had the monopoly on violence. (al- 
Khalil 1989) This psychologically damaged society would be both the battleground 
and the prize to be won in the US occupation, however it was not understood prior 
to the invasion. 
 
 
 
Removing Saddam from power would not just „free‟ the people and only 
disadvantage the privileged members of his elite, it would also radically alter the 
fabric of society in Iraq as a whole, and lead to economic disadvantage even as it 
supposedly granted political freedom. A cohesive plan for how this dramatic shift 
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would be managed was lacking in the pre-war stages. It was the responsibility of 
the administration rather than the military to plan for such a shift, as it would out 
of necessity involve huge societal changes that a military force would inherently 
be ill-equipped to manage. It would be a long term effort that would require 
participation from multiple agencies, protected by and working with the military, 
but certainly not supplanted by them. The challenge was to win the political will 
of the people, and that is not achievable with overwhelming military force alone. 
In fact, the „crush them‟ mentality popular amongst neo-conservatives still 
convinced of the US‟s ability to intervene unilaterally has been shown by a recent 
RAND Corporation study to have strong evidence against its success in COIN. (Paul 
et al 20108) 
 
 
 
 
When the US entered Iraq it was not immediately entering into 4GW; there was no 
insurgency yet to fight, and the adversary was Saddam and his supporters. 
However, the war aims past the removal of Saddam were not achievable through 
3GW methods, and a well thought out plan would have acknowledged this and 
prepared for the potential of insurgencies, and planned to secure Iraqi‟s political 
will. 
 
 
 
Given the chaotic nature of the pre-war planning, the secrecy with which a 
relatively small number of troops had to be manoeuvred into position, and the 
almost farcical inaccuracy of the intelligence regarding Iraq, the first twenty seven 
days of warfare were a great success for the US. The „Fortress Baghdad‟ so feared 
by Rice and President George W. Bush (Woodward 2004) failed to materialize and 
 
 
 
8 
Please see Appendix D for the table 
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most of Iraq was under nominal US control within a month. Even as the US was 
winning the short initial battle, however, it was losing the longer term war. 
Internal bickering and wrangling between departments and personalities in the 
administration, left unchecked by the President, stymied those on the ground. The 
President had repeatedly asked about humanitarian aid and how quickly it could be 
delivered, making it clear that this was a priority for him. (Woodward 2004) 
Accordingly, many post war plans focused on supplying essentials of life and coping 
with refugees, with precious little effort expended on planning for long term 
security and peace. 
 
 
 
A lack of unity at higher levels in planning strategy will filter through the ranks to 
sow confusion and disorder below. When planning the war in Iraq, there was a 
clear lack of unity in the National Security Council (NSC), and particularly between 
the State Department, led by Colin Powell, and the Department of Defense, 
headed by Donald Rumsfeld. (Woodward 2004) Opposing views within a NSC are to 
be expected, however the fundamental disagreements between these two men 
regarding the future of Iraq, whether to wage war, and how to conduct such a war 
were allowed to continue throughout the US invasion. This lack of cohesiveness 
right at the upper echelons of power would prove disastrous as the war in Iraq 
progressed. 
 
 
 
There was also a lack of continuation of leadership in the administration and the 
military. At the time that Paul Bremer was entering Iraq to take control of the CPA 
and replace Jay Garner of The Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian 
Assistance (ORHA), a number of other replacements were taking place in the 
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military, and certain administration members were absenting themselves from 
further engagement with Iraq. General Franks was preparing for retirement, and 
General Shinseki also retired, with Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz both refusing to attend 
his retirement ceremony, pointing to a huge disconnect between the civil and 
military arms of the government. (Ricks 2006, 156) Feith had also distanced 
himself from the situation in Iraq, with one Pentagon official describing him as 
somebody who “agitated for war in Iraq, but once the decision is made to do it, he 
disengages.” (Ricks 2006, 167) This in addition to General Frank‟s much quoted 
comment that Feith was “the fucking stupidest guy on the face of the earth”. 
(Goldberg 2005) These shifts and bickerings are worth noting as they show that the 
US had indeed failed to understand how the war could develop. In 4GW war it is 
essential that knowledge, especially local knowledge from those on the ground, is 
maintained and passed over gradually to new incomers. Relationships that have 
been built up need to be nurtured and incrementally moved over to new contacts, 
and clarity regarding the overall mission needs to be confirmed. (Nagl 2002) 
 
 
 
A plan appropriate for a potential 4GW war would have seen a continuation of 
leadership at the top levels, and gradual replacements with long handover periods 
further down the ranks. Instead, by confusing regime removal with regime change, 
the administration and the military both had end points for key staff occurring at 
precisely the wrong times when the delicate balance between instability and 
insurgency tipped. 
 
 
 
Another example of this disconnect, and perhaps a more obvious one in the sense 
of the media impact, is provided by the looting. ORHA had created a list of sites in 
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Baghdad that it would be imperative to provide security for. This compiled list was 
passed to the military, however it was never given the importance it warranted 
and disseminated to ground level commanders. Instead the military had their own 
list, which prioritized the Ministry of Oil and allowed the looting and destruction of 
two very important institutions: the Baghdad Museum and the Ministry of 
Information, the impact of which will be discussed later. (Chandrasekaran 2006; 
Diamond 2005) 
 
 
 
The lack of military support for ORHA over the list of important sites was not an 
isolated incident, but instead symptomatic of a general marginalization of this 
group. Garner had been asked to take control of ORHA on January 17th  2003, a 
mere two months before the war began. In his brief the assumptions made by the 
administration are clear and revealed to be woefully inaccurate. Garner was 
briefed with running post-war Iraq until an interim Iraqi government was set up by 
the Iraqi people, which was predicted to take about 90 days. Feith assured him 
that the Iraqi people would move quickly to take control of their country and 
handle the infrastructure, painting Garner‟s role as light touch and mainly 
concerned with immediate humanitarian assistance that was the President‟s 
priority. (Chandrasekaran 2006) This is perhaps the starkest proof that the planning 
by the administration was fatally flawed. 
 
 
 
Ricks refers to a “cloud of cognitive dissonance” at Rumsfeld‟s level and above 
(Ricks 2006, 168), as the situation in Iraq failed to meet any of their expectations 
and the force stalled. Garner and others were discovering that the Iraqi 
infrastructure had already been weakened by years of cannibalization, by the 
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bombing campaign, and finally by the looting, leaving it in dire need of expensive 
and extensive overhauls. As the expected and hoped for Iraqi control of 
infrastructure and government failed to materialize the ORHA‟s lack of funding and 
resources started to create a power vacuum.  Garner and his team were obviously 
floundering. The administration clearly agreed that under the ORHA Iraq was not 
shaping up as they expected, as less than a month after Garner had arrived in Iraq, 
he was told that he was to be replaced by L. Paul Bremer III. The ORHA would also 
be supplanted by the CPA. Whilst the ORHA had been envisaged as light touch and 
merely a quick staging post before Iraqi take over, the CPA, and Bremer in 
particular, saw their brief as far more long term and involved. Bremer was clear 
from the outset that he saw himself fulfilling an important role and aimed to “take 
clear, public and decisive steps” to reinforce that idea throughout Iraq. (Ricks 
2006, 158) He was entering an arena however in which the US had lost the 
initiative, the US force had ceased to have utility, and in which the 4GW aspects of 
the mission were still not prioritized or even understood. There was not an 
understanding yet that the US was starting to be dragged into a 4GW engagement, 
and the actions being taken were hastening that eventuality. 
 
 
 
Bremer‟s actions, particularly his notorious decisions regarding the dissolution of 
the Iraqi Army and de-Baathification, will be discussed as 4GW failures as well as 
strategic mistakes further on. Aside from the large mistakes such as the first two 
executive orders, other missteps added to the difficulty of winning the Iraqi people 
over. As those within the administration had not considered that this would be a 
necessary action, it was lacking in the post war plans. The rosy view did not allow 
for a post war scenario in which the US would find it necessary to engage in soft 
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power diplomacy and psywar to win over the populace. Galbraith also points out 
what he terms a “…culture of arrogance that pervaded the Bush administration” 
(Galbraith 2006, 83) that led them to completely neglect learning anything about 
the country they were about to invade. Saddam was a ruthless dictator who kept 
an iron grip on his monopoly of violence. When the US deposed him, they made no 
immediate moves to supplant his authority, allowing instead a power vacuum to 
develop that was immediately filled. In the next chapter I show how the US 
botched its communication, and lost the trust of the Iraqis. Faulty pre-war 
planning, poor intelligence, and a tangled chain of command all contributed to this 
failure. 
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Chapter Three: “The Signal and the Noise”: The US Fails, and Fails to 
 
Communicate. 
 
 
 
 
When targeting the will of people is the fundamental aim in warfare, as it is in 
 
4GW, communication will be key. Communication in this case relates to how the 
US communicated their message to their soldiers and personnel deployed to Iraq, 
to the Iraqis, and to the rest of the world. It involves the messages given by the 
terms used to describe the engagement, as correctly labelling the conflict is 
necessary to conceptualise the response, and of course the use of the media. 
 
 
 
In each area the US made serious missteps regarding the approach taken from the 
outset, which naturally led to costly mistakes in theatre. The errors in approach 
were fundamental in nature, speaking to an administration and military grappling 
with a type of warfare they were unprepared to engage in. Significantly, the US 
decision makers were also unwilling to recognise these errors, and correctly 
classify the type of warfare they were engaging in and use appropriate tactics, 
adhering instead to a vision of the situation far removed from reality. This was not 
an approach conducive to 4GW, as a learning environment was not fostered from 
the top down. Inspecting the high level errors of approach in communication and 
military organisation will demonstrate the general ineptitude of the US entering 
and occupying Iraq, whilst the next chapter will delve deeper into specific 
examples. 
 
 
 
Excellent communication is paramount in 4GW, as a 4GW war is inherently about 
the message, the story being told, and the strength with which it can be conveyed 
50  
and understood by the target audiences. (Hammes 2006) Communication is the 
responsibility of both military and civilian authorities, as it refers not only to 
official communications such as speeches and leaflets to Iraqis, instead reaching 
much broader to encompass actions taken in theatre which may be interpreted and 
„read‟ for messages, the internal narrative the US told itself, and the external 
projection of its actions it showed to the world. (Bolt 2012) 
 
 
 
As Andrew Mackay and Steve Tatham point out, “Audiences do not sit passively and 
receive messages; instead they contextualize them according to a host of external 
factors…”. (Mackay and Tatham 2011, 77) In short, a communications model does 
not resemble the very basic picture following in which the US could take position 
“A” and simply send their official message out to be received by the Iraqis in 
position “B”. 
 
 
 
Figure One: Basic model of communication (Mackay and Tatham 2011, 76) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Instead, official messages are heavily contextualized by unofficial messages, 
outside events, and actions. They are further received through a filter of cultural 
belief and understanding that may distort the intentions of the sender. An actual 
communications model may more resemble the following, in which messages can 
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be accepted, discarded, or modified based upon a number of factors that influence 
both parties. Opinions and attitudes already in existence may further act upon 
both “A” and “B”, with or without their conscious knowledge. 
 
 
 
 
Figure Two: Mackay and Tatham pragmatic-complexity model of communication. 
 
(Mackay and Tatham 2011, 79) 
 
 
 
Thus, when President George W. Bush confidently asserted that “…we are 
rehabilitating power plants, water and sanitation facilities, bridges, and 
airports...The primary goal of our coalition in Iraq is self-government for the 
people of Iraq” in his address to the United Nations General Council in 2003, this 
official message would have been received very differently in Iraq. (Bush 2003) 
Within Baghdad Iraqis had witnessed looting that encompassed even hospitals, 
were struggling with power outages and a lack of basic services, and were under 
the meddling control of the CPA. Any official message would be filtered through 
the „noise‟ of all of these events, dosed with a healthy amount of scepticism bred 
from decades of propaganda translation, and automatically sifted for clues as to 
which side to back for the best chance of security. 
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When examining the communications from the US administration and military 
therefore, it is important to consider not just the message, but also the cultural 
assumptions that underpin them and the filter through which they would be 
perceived by the target audience. Paul Bohannan, a prominent anthropologist, 
once wrote that “There is no more complete way to misunderstand a foreign 
civilisations that to see it in terms of one‟s own civilisation.” (Mackay and Tatham 
2011, 79) In the US assumptions about the Iraqi willingness to embrace Western- 
style democracy the US administration was guilty of this very action. The 
desirability of democracy was seen as a given, hence the promise of it was 
believed to be a powerful inducement. The US saw no initial need to „sell‟ the 
idea; to the contrary, it was seen as the hook with which to win Iraqi popular 
support. A more realistic approach to the planning would have noted that 
democracy was not necessarily the preferred Iraqi method of governance, 
unsurprisingly for a country created only after World War One, most Iraqis held 
loyalty along tribal, religious, and clan lines rather to political parties. Commander 
Abel Nouri, the deputy chief of the Iraqi Navy, remarked in 2005 “It is not that I do 
not like democracy, it was more that we Iraqis were not used to exercising 
freedom. We are like prisoners set free from prison. We do not know what to do.” 
(Downes 2006, 214) Even if Iraqis had wanted to band together in political 
groupings, over two decades of harsh repression of all political movements other 
than the Ba‟ath Party had ensured little prior experience of such a system. If the 
US was wedded to the idea of an Iraq governed by Western-style democracy, it 
should have planned far more concertedly for how to foster a desire for the same 
in Iraqis. Alternatively if the main concern was a „free‟ Iraq without Saddam 
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Hussein, the US should have been prepared to accept a form of government chosen 
by Iraqis rather than insisting on democracy, let alone offering it as a reward. 
 
 
 
The cultural lens of Iraqis would naturally share many facets with other Arab states 
as their histories and traditions interlink, and of course tribes and religions do not 
follow state boundary lines9. The probable reaction of these neighbouring states 
should therefore have been included in planned communications, as they would 
necessarily influence the situation in Iraq. Whilst it is doubtful that any message 
would have resulted in whole hearted support for the invasion, the US could have 
done more to counter negative perceptions; perceptions that become even more 
relevant when Iraqis gained access to TV channels such as al-Jazeera, which will be 
discussed later. 
 
 
 
The messages from the US did little to reassure other Arab states. Examples of 
rhetoric from President George W. Bush include “We are advancing freedom in the 
broader Middle East”, (Bush 2005) and “the United States ... will help the Iraqi 
people ... create the institutions of liberty in a unified Iraq, at peace with its 
neighbors”. (Bush 2002) His 18th  March 2003 address on the eve of the invasion is 
particularly rife with references to unwarranted threats and promises of liberties, 
the two twining round one another to create a tapestry of justification for US 
action. Excerpts from this alone include “...patient and honorable efforts to 
disarm the Iraqi regime without war... Our good faith has not been returned... The 
 
regime has a history of reckless aggression in the Middle East... The danger is 
 
 
 
9 
The understanding that tribal politics would be key was lacking at the highest levels. As late as January 2003 
President George W. Bush was unaware that there was a difference between Sunnis and Shiites. (Galbraith 
2006) 
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clear...with the help of Iraq, the terrorists could fulfill their stated ambitions and 
kill thousands or hundreds of thousands of innocent people in our country, or any 
other...The United States and other nations did nothing to deserve or invite this 
threat... The United States... will work to advance liberty and peace in that 
region.” 
 
These statements, and others regarding the „tyranny‟ and threat of Saddam 
Hussein, do little to assuage any of the concerns from the Arab states. Many would 
argue that the US did indeed invite and deserve this perceived threat from Saddam 
through their continued support for Israel at the expense of Palestinians, the most 
pressing justification ahead of perceived moral lassitude and general anti- 
American fervor. The case for war was laid out as necessary due to threats to the 
US, a dangerous precedent of pre-emptive warfare that would not have reassured 
countries that could imagine finding themselves so targeted due to association 
with the nebulous and all-encompassing term „terrorists‟. The stark bi-polar choice 
of “with us or against us” left no room for the subtlety and nuances of 
international diplomacy, in which the US is just one player. At a time when the US 
supported states in the area ruled by monarchies, with systems of governance that 
were decidedly undemocratic, their fervor to bring peace and liberty to Iraq alone 
was also questionable. (Tatham 2006) 
 
 
 
The message being exported overseas is just one factor that merits consideration. 
In 4GW war the people are the centre of gravity upon which the entire endeavour 
hinges; the prize to be won rather than merely the battleground upon which the 
war is fought. Any service men/women or administration employees who were to 
be deployed to Iraq should have had this drilled into them prior to their 
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deployment, and emphasised repeatedly once there. They should have been given 
cultural lessons about Iraqi culture, studied the history of the area, and attempted 
as far as possible to respect local customs and traditions. In a short period of time 
before deployment there are of course limits to how in-depth such cultural training 
can be. The US should however have focused on their human capital and found 
their most talented and adaptable professionals to immerse in study. These 
individuals should have been prepared for long deployments in which they could 
build up interpersonal relationships of mutual trust with Iraqi stakeholders, and 
function as a bridge between Iraqis and the US. The organisational philosophy of 
the US military and administration was not however suited to such engagement, 
focused as it had been since the 1990s on modularity and multi-functionality of 
troops. (Lujan 2013) Rather than deep regional specialists with language fluency, 
who spend many years, decades even, building up relationships and a systematic 
knowledge of areas of interest, the Pentagon has instead focused on creating 
generalists who can deploy anywhere, at any time. (Lujan 2013) Whilst this 
approach has its benefits, it cannot replicate the trust built over long 
engagements, and personal rapport fostered by talented people who are experts in 
relationship building. Without these deep level regional specialists the US should 
have at the least focused their personnel psychologically to see the Iraqis as the 
prize and the lynchpin to success, instead however, it could be argued that a great 
number of US personnel saw Iraqis not as the prize, but as the enemy. 
 
Although there was much talk about „liberating‟ Iraq, and implied gratitude from 
the Iraqis, the message that Iraq was linked to the attacks of 9/1110  led to a 
 
 
 
10 
Please see Appendix E for tables showing the prevalence of this viewpoint amongst US citizens. 
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mindset that saw Iraqis as the adversary. The combination of this attitude, and 
later, a perceived lack of gratitude for US efforts, poisoned the relationship. US 
soldiers who had been led to believe that Iraqis would be grateful to see them 
arrive reported surprise that “there was no happy reaction from the Iraqis. We 
were greeted with indifference. No one clapped or waved flags. They just stared 
at us and waited for us to leave.” (Crawford 2005, 205) 
 
 
 
As regards integrating with and respecting the culture which they would be 
entering, apart from a few special forces exceptions such as Ar-Rutbah, which will 
be discussed in more detail in the next chapter, and Tal Afar, (Gordon and Trainor 
2013) there was instead a concerted effort not to challenge US forces or civilians 
with the unfamiliar. The Green Zone in Iraq is the most prominent example of this; 
US administration and military camped out in Saddam‟s former palace, eating 
pizza and pork hot dogs, often served by Muslim Iraqis, by a pool, and venturing 
into the streets mainly for high speed patrols in armoured cars and Humvees. 
(Chandrasekaran 2006) A lack of Arabic speaking service and civilian personnel has 
been cited many times as a problematic factor in post-conflict Iraq, but further 
than this there was a lack of understanding regarding the basic cultural courtesies. 
An ex-British Army security contractor, amongst others, has given examples of 
witnessing US failures to understand a situation on the ground, perhaps the most 
pertinent of which involves a peaceful demonstration in 2004. A 10,000 strong 
crowd of Iraqis was marching loudly but peacefully, carrying pictures of their 
religious leaders and chanting. They were demanding free elections, exactly what 
the US was claiming to offer. An oil convoy guarded by US troops was attempting 
to use the same road, and the US troops may have thought the marchers were 
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there to block the convoy. They descended into the marchers, fired shots into the 
air and screamed at them to disperse, turning a peaceful demonstration into a 
fully-fledged angry mob. The crowd did disperse, but with the belief that the US 
forces were there to deny them access to a free election. (Ashcroft 2006, 195) The 
lack of respect shown to the Iraqis would have turned the mood of the entire 
crowd, and those they told the story to, against the US. 
 
 
 
Further examples include the US not participating in the cultural exchanges that 
many Iraqis found essential in polite dealings; finding interminable exchanges 
regarding the health of one‟s family and colleagues a waste of time when business 
was to be discussed. (Ashcroft 2006) Conducting house searches without the male 
head of the household being present, using sniffer dogs, and body searches of 
females were all acts that convinced many Iraqis that the US had no respect for 
them or their country and were there to humiliate and repress them. (Allawi 2007, 
186) These measures also did not serve to reassure Iraqis regarding their own 
security. Leading up to the 2005 election General George W. Casey asked his 
Commander‟s Initiative Group to analyse polling data to ascertain the challenges 
ahead. They found that 50% of Iraqis surveyed did not feel safe in their own 
neighbourhoods, and that a scant 23% felt that the presence of the coalition in any 
way contributed to their safety. (Gordon and Trainor 2013, 99) 
 
Alongside these personal interactions, the wider message being communicated was 
not a reassuring one for most Iraqis. The US had taken over Iraq, but seemed to 
care little for how most Iraqis would survive. Those entering the country through 
the main portal of Baghdad Airport had their passports stamped; “Baghdad 
International Airport. Entry. CPA” and the date. (Downes 2006, 55) There was no 
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mention of Iraq, no recognition that this was anything other than a CPA controlled 
area. US road convoys travelled through crowded streets by blaring their horns and 
firing warning shots at cars that neglected to move out of their way fast enough. 
(Ashcroft, 2006) Those that had warning shots were actually fortunate, as many 
others were fired upon in the streets and at checkpoints by jumpy US military 
personnel, leading to avoidable civilian deaths and understandable rage at the US 
forces. The ideas held by many of the US ground troops in Iraq were terrifyingly 
simplistic, with the entire scenario being divided into “good guys” and “bad guys”, 
with no understanding of the subtleties of the complex society they were operating 
in. (Downes 2006, 229.) Even before the abuses at Abu Ghraib came to light, there 
was plenty of evidence for Iraqis to conclude that the US was an occupying force 
determined to treat the Iraqi people with disdain and contempt. Against the 
communication impact of all these actions, official flyers and leaflets, grand 
speeches, or sanctioned messages broadcast by the Iraqi Media Network (IMN) 
would have little to no effect. 
 
 
 
 
The military and administration that was making these missteps was clearly 
unsuited for the type of warfare in which it was engaging. It is worth looking at the 
state of the military in particular, beyond the previously mentioned modularity, as 
that organisation was undergoing a restructure from the very top at the time of 
the conflict. Rumsfeld was clear in his memoirs that one of his most fundamental 
aims in taking up his post was to transform the military; to restructure it to better 
fit with situations of the modern age. He required forces that were, in the words 
of the President who appointed him, “lethal, light, and mobile.” (Rumsfeld 2011, 
294) Rumsfeld also states that intelligence needed to improve, although he focuses 
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on how it needed to improve in order to better facilitate precision targeting, a 
very 3GW approach rooted in the belief that the RMA would provide success in 
warfare through technological advances. Throughout his memoirs, and throughout 
the planning and conduct of the conflict in Iraq, he fails to recognise the 
importance of intelligence for more than physical and targeting needs. His 
experience in the military led him to have strong views on what it should be used 
for. In his memoirs he reasserts his view that “I did not think resolving other 
countries‟ internal political disputes, paving roads, erecting power lines, policing 
streets, building stock markets, and organizing democratic governmental bodies 
were missions for our men and women in uniform.” (Rumsfield 2011, 482) This was 
a viewpoint he shared with the President, and National Security Advisor 
Condeleeza Rice, both of whom had openly mocked the idea of using the US 
military for „nation building‟ in the 2000 election campaign. (Gordon and Trainor 
2013) Almost all such nation-building actions are important parts of waging 
successful psywar, particularly the “constructive” side of COIN, in which you offer 
to the populace a better system of governance and structure.11  (Gavrilis 2009) 
 
 
 
The military was not the sole organisation to fail to achieve long term aims in Iraq. 
There could broadly be said to be three dimensions to the situation: the military 
dimension concerned with the defeat of Saddam; the political dimension of 
returning sovereignty to Iraqis in the form of a democratic government; and the 
societal dimension of caring for and helping Iraqis. All three should have been part 
of an integrated whole of liberation, with military and civilian agencies working 
 
 
 
11 
The stock exchange, admittedly, seems more of a vanity project than an essential post-conflict 
reconstruction effort, especially when you consider it was tasked to a 24 year old with no financial experience. 
(Galbraith 2006, 126 and Chandrasekaran 2006) 
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together in different areas towards the same overall aim. The second two 
dimensions, the political and the societal, should have been the main 
responsibilities of first the ORHA, and shortly thereafter the CPA. In post-conflict 
liberations, or indeed in any post-conflict situation, it is important that people see 
actions to improve their lives happening very quickly. (Diamond 2005) Instead of 
this Iraqis initially experienced a hiatus in which no one seemed to be in charge, 
followed by the incompetent bungling of the CPA, an organisation that seemed to 
focus on the minutiae of administration whilst allowing the basics of reconstruction 
to be ignored. Commentators who experienced working with the CPA report a 
dichotomy of overall grandiose schemes to transform all of Iraq, and incessant 
tinkering with the detail of even the simplest schemes. (Chandrasekaran, Downes, 
Diamond, Galbraith, North, Ricks) It was given the derogatory nickname, the 
“Can‟t Provide Anything”. (Galbraith 2006) Under the rule of the CPA the Iraqi 
people actually experienced a decrease in their standard of living as far as the 
essentials of life and security are concerned. To take the provision of electricity as 
one example, in Baghdad citizens under Saddam had become accustomed to more 
hours of electricity than the rest of the country, and whilst electrical demand did 
outstrip supply (approximately 3,500MW produced to 7,000 – 8,000MW needed), 
(Haddad and Piven 2013) there was a fairly constant supply of power. Under the 
CPA the demand increased as Iraqis purchased goods previously unavailable under 
sanctions, such as air conditioners and satellite dishes, yet the supply dwindled, 
and was shared across the entire Iraq grid rather than focused on Baghdad. 
 
 
 
Although the US remained obstinate in its early determination not to engage with 
the constructive side of COIN, their enemies were quick to seize the advantage this 
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offered them, perhaps better understanding the nature of communication through 
action; the propaganda of the deed. When the Mahdi Army briefly took control of 
Sadr City in the Sadr City Uprising, they took control of the power plants and kept 
the electricity flowing for 24 hours a day. This was in contrast to the CPA rationing 
imposed on the strained electrical infrastructure; a necessary rationing if the Iraqi 
electrical grid was to survive. The 24 hour provision of electricity would not have 
been sustainable, however it sent a powerful message to the Iraqi citizens about 
the ability of the insurgents to provide where the coalition was unable or unwilling 
to. (Gordon and Trainor 2013, 69) As a psywar tactic, it was brilliant. 
 
 
 
Whilst the CPA held meetings about redrafting Iraq‟s traffic laws to include 
restrictions on following other cars too closely, and promulgated memos regarding 
an entire new democratic system to encompass the whole of Iraq, outside the 
Green Zone these debates seemed far removed from the reality of daily life. The 
CPA should have been working with the military to maintain order through military 
means in the short term, whilst seeking out local authority figures to take over the 
social and political aspects. Not least because local contacts would far better be 
able to navigate their way through a society and power structure that they 
understood well and the US seemed blind to. Numerous examples show that the US 
failed to take offered opportunities to work with tribal leaders willing to support 
the coalition, not least because the prevailing US view was that the tribal 
structure was old-fashioned and obsolete under a new democratic form of 
governance. (Gordon and Trainor 2013) 
62  
Although it cannot be stated with complete definition when the situation in Iraq 
tipped into a fully-fledged insurgency, within a few months the US forces were 
engaged in COIN warfare. 4GW is an evolved form of insurgency (Hammes 2006), 
hence COIN tactics need to be used to counter it. In the Iraq theatre, however, it 
would seem that those lower down the command chain were the first to realise 
and correctly define the type of combat they were embroiled in, whilst their 
efforts were hampered by those above them who stubbornly refused to accept that 
they were fighting an insurgency even as they started to lose it. Bremer insisted on 
calling the insurgents “terrorists” (Diamond 2006, 47); Rumsfeld named them 
“pockets of dead enders” (Ricks 2006, 169); and Wolfowitz called them both 
“remnants of the old regime” and “the last remnants of a dying cause”. (Ricks 
2006,170) The military and civilian agencies, such as the CPA, are very 
hierarchical. The actions and mood of the whole are reliant upon the words and 
guidance of those at the top. If the commander-in-chief and the top echelons of 
both the military and civilian administration state that there is no ongoing war, no 
prolonged conflict, and certainly no “quagmire” or insurgency, then this 
necessarily impacts on the effectiveness of the forces below them.  A refusal to 
countenance that COIN operations need to be implemented will hamstring the 
utility of the force on the ground; unable to define the conflict that it finds itself 
engaging in, or use the techniques best suited to it. 
 
 
 
Even as the Defense Department and senior commanders refused to classify the 
enemy as insurgents, local and regional commanders were trying to change their 
methods from the ground up. Setting up online forums such as “Small Wars 
Journal” and trading tips and techniques in person and via emails, ground level 
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commanders recognised the war they were fighting and made efforts to meet it 
appropriately.  (Kilcullen 2010, 19) In the second battle of Fallujah in 2004, some 
Marines even used a Microsoft chat programme to share intelligence and reports 
with one another and the general Army, a method that proved far faster and safer 
than the approved military technique of physically running between organisations 
to speak face-to-face, as only high level echelons of each organisation were 
officially allowed to communicate.  (Gordon and Trainor 2013, 119) Contemporary 
COIN techniques and learning from the practise of the same was brought into the 
full light of military analysis, with approval from the top levels of leadership, only 
as recently as 2006. (Kilcullen 2010) That left three years for those at the ground 
level to quietly discuss the issue amongst themselves and attempt to win a war 
their organisations had not fully admitted they were engaged in. Although it is the 
mark of an organisation fit for 4GW warfare that it will out of necessity be a 
learning and self-critical organisation (Hammes 2006), the willingness to examine 
strategy and tactics came too late for the military that entered Iraq in 2003. 
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Chapter Four: Squandered Trust: Examples of “Betrayal” and Missed 
 
Opportunities 
 
 
 
 
"What we have lost and what has been broken is priceless. We will never put a 
number on it.” Donny George, Director General of Iraq‟s State Board of 
Antiquities. (George, 2003) 
 
 
 
“Freedom‟s untidy…stuff happens…” “Looting is an unfortunate thing…it 
happens and it‟s unfortunate…” Donald Rumsfeld (Rumsfeld 2011, 477) 
 
 
 
The disconnect between Iraqis and the US administration seems epitomized in 
these two separate responses to the looting in Baghdad at the cessation of 
conventional warfare in May 2003. The collision of such disparate viewpoints 
confronted with a fracturing Iraq ate into any tentative trust that may have been 
built between Iraqis and their occupiers. Trust is not implicitly given to those who 
simply title themselves liberators; it has to be earned by more than the removal of 
an oppressor and their regime. Trust does not have to spring from ideological 
similarities, or even agreement, but it is essential in COIN. David Kilcullen, the 
well regarded author of Counterinsurgency, summarizes this point when he notes 
the truism that the people you want to support you, or at least not oppose you, 
don‟t have to like you, but they must trust you. (Kilcullen 2010) Faced with a 
dangerous situation such as a civil war or an occupation, the majority of people, if 
not directly involved, will choose to support the side that they believe offers the 
most security and safety. They may not support that side‟s ideology or 
wholeheartedly subscribe to its tenets, but they will offer it tacit support if they 
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trust that the promises made, threatening or enticing, will be kept. The US had 
promised to remove Saddam, and they had done, but by then failing immediately 
to keep law and order and continue the provision of the necessities of life, they 
lost the trust and respect of the Iraqi people they had just „liberated‟. By not 
viewing themselves as in interim but immediate control of Iraq, with the inherent 
responsibilities of the same, they lost prestige and allowed an insurgency to 
develop. 
 
 
 
I have chosen to focus on four particular examples, out of many, of US actions that 
corrosively eroded the psychological contract between the US and Iraqis; the lack 
of response to the immediate post-war looting, the failure of the Iraqi Media 
Network (IMN), and the first two CPA orders ordering de-Ba‟athification and the 
dissolution of the Iraqi military. These examples epitomize certain important 
facets of 4GW failure; a lack of control and thus trustworthiness in the realm of 
security, a failure to control the message, an unwillingness to co-opt and 
cooperate with existing power players, and the disenfranchisement of a trained, 
armed group of potential allies or at least neutral players. Contrasting these large 
scale failures to a small scale Special Forces success in Ar-Rutbah demonstrates 
that these failures were not inevitable, and provides a population-centered 
warfare model to examine. 
 
 
 
The US military and civil administrations both failed to consider the population as 
the centre point of warfare. James A. Gavrilis, an ex-Special Forces officer who 
had initial success in the Ar-Rutbah area of Iraq when he was tasked with taking it 
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during the invasion, has created a model for population-centered warfare which in 
its simplest form is represented thus: 
 
 
 
Figure Three: Gavrilis model of population centric warfare - basic state of play at 
 
start. (Gavrilis 2009, 7) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Gavrilis further expands this model from the basic state of play at the start of an 
engagement to demonstrate how actions and messages on both sides may influence 
the population segments. The government‟s goal is to act on the population 
segments, through the military (as this is a model that is military specific), in such 
a way as to move them towards passive or active support for the government, 
whilst stopping insurgency actions and countering insurgency messages that may 
move population segments to support the insurgency. The model takes notes of 
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external actions and actors, useful for 4GW engagements, which due to their 
connected nature and use of the media are rarely if ever fought in a vacuum free 
from external influence. Whilst the model is not ground breaking in terms of 
overall theory, it is the concept of examining and reporting on the battlefield with 
the population as the centre of gravity that is vital. Through mapping the 
population, and planning military actions based on how this action could move the 
population segments it requires officers and decision makers to keep the 
population and their potential reactions at the forefront of their minds in decision 
making and planning. An adaptation of this model for civilian agencies could have 
been of great use, however it is worth noting that these models, along with others, 
are only valuable assets if there is true intelligence and an understanding of the 
nature of the population segments attempting to be influenced. Without this 
knowledge to guide the planning and anticipate population segment movements, 
the model is nothing more than guesswork. It requires honest appraisals of 
progress, and the willingness to change tactics if needed; to be an adaptable, 
intelligent, learning organisation. 
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Figure Four: Gavrilis model of population centric warfare – military action and 
 
external support (Gavrilis 2009, 14) 
 
 
 
The Gavrilis model concerns primarily COIN, but is useful for considering how best 
to counter an insurgency before it has started (traditionally the best time to do 
so). If, in these figures, we substitute the occupation forces, both military and 
civil, for the “government” in the model, we can see how the US should have 
acted upon the population segments in order to influence them and bring them 
towards either active or passive occupation support. Those who it was impossible 
to co-opt to the cause should have been removed and if necessary eliminated, 
however those who could be swayed into occupation support should have been the 
targets of focused psywar to move their support levels. Gavrilis put his model into 
practice in Ar-Rutbah, and against a backdrop of increasing hostility towards US 
troops he succeeded in constructive engagement with the Iraqi populace. Within a 
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few weeks talks with the future (Iraqi) mayor, head of police, and various other 
power players were well under way. (Ricks 2006, 152) Gavrilis was busy in creating 
what he terms the “constructive side” of COIN, which he holds to be more 
important than the destructive side. By this he refers to creating an alternative 
form of government and outperforming the adversary. (Gavrilis 2009) He was 
dealing with this concept at a fairly micro level in one province, however it was a 
concept that the US would have done well to consider for the entirety of Iraq. 
Gavrilis examined Ar-Rutbah as an integrated whole comprising of geographical, 
societal, economic, military, and political layers, and prioritized the population as 
the most vital element of his campaign. Ar-Rutbah was only under the control of 
Gavrilis for a short time, realistically preventing a theoretical extrapolation of his 
methods across Iraq, however the fact that this area was not only pacified, but 
actively engaged with US forces in reconstruction helps evidence that the ever- 
worsening situation in the rest of Iraq was not unavoidable. 
 
 
 
Instead of considering the use of a model such as this, immediately after the fall of 
Baghdad a lack of action regarding the looting moved many away from such passive 
or active occupation support. The first images from Baghdad were jubilant and 
promising, including a large statue of Saddam being toppled and Iraqis swarming 
around to hit it physically including with their shoes. Although not quite the 
cheering crowds strewing flowers over US tanks that would have been welcomed, 
these images showed Iraqis expressing their hatred of the old regime and even 
(briefly) working together with the US forces to dismantle some of the obvious 
signs of it. Within hours of these images being broadcast to the world however, far 
less salubrious images were filling TV screens. Looting began in the Ministry of 
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Industry, and quickly spread. Within days the lawless rampaging had spread to 
include ransacking the Museum of Antiquities and the Library amongst other 
precious stockpiles of irreplaceable culture and history. Images on the news 
showed Iraqis running with loot past stationary US forces sitting in their tanks and 
standing fully armed guarding nothing more than the Ministry of Oil. Popular 
perception can be more important than reality, so no matter the intent, the 
failure to stop the looting promulgated the perception of an impotent, or worse, 
uncaring US force. Aside from the immediate psywar loss of prestige, not acting to 
stop this looting had long reaching serious implications for the US post war 
presence in Iraq. Looters destroyed or stole valuable information crucial to post 
war reconstruction, including records of Ba‟ath party membership, schematics for 
the water supply, and personnel records for Ministries amongst others. (Allawi 
2007) 
 
 
 
 
The looting was an immediate and immense disaster in 4GW terms on multiple 
levels. It showed the US forces as weak and unable to control the city. The lack of 
authority displayed immediately ceded control to whoever could take it. In their 
failure to protect culturally important sites, the US forces seemed uncaring and 
dismissive of the importance of such stockpiles of heritage and culture. One 
journalist was told by a cleric in Baghdad “I simply cannot understand how your 
soldiers could have stood by and watched. Maybe, they are weak, too. Maybe they 
are wicked.” (Diamond 2005, 282) Iraqi trust was being squandered immediately, 
as Baghdad citizens had to make choices about where their future security and 
safety lay, and the US military did very little to support and reassure them. The 
psychological contract between Iraqis and the US was being broken before there 
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had been a chance to truly cement it, with the political price being, as Larry 
Diamond put it; “having Iraqis equate freedom with disorder and violence.” 
(Diamond 2005, 282) 
 
 
 
Martin E. Sullivan, chairman of President Bush's Cultural Property Advisory 
Committee, resigned on April 17th  2003 over the looting, along with a number of 
his colleagues. He stated that "The tragedy was not prevented, due to our nation's 
inaction."  Gary Vikan, a member of the committee who resigned, further stated: 
“We certainly know the value of oil, but we certainly don‟t know the value of 
historical artifacts.” Unfortunately, the sight of Marines guarding the Ministry of 
Oil whilst the Museum and Library were ransacked gave this viewpoint credence in 
the eyes of the watching world and the Iraqis who saw it first hand. 
 
 
 
The communication from the top echelons of US power further reinforced the 
image of an uncaring US removed from the reality of the situation. “Freedom‟s 
untidy”, and “stuff happens” from Rumsfeld, sent the signal that the 
administration did not take the destruction and violence seriously. On the ground 
the top ranks in the military were echoing the “hands off” approach that the 
administration was touting. Brigadier General Vincent Brooks seemed to concur 
with Rumsfeld about the role of the military: “At no point do we really see 
becoming a police force… What we see is taking actions that are necessary to 
create stability.” (Brooks 2003) 
 
 
 
A gradual erosion of any gratitude that Iraqis might have felt was taking place 
which would damage occupation efforts in the long term. The brutality and harsh 
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repression of the dictatorship under Saddam cannot be overlooked; there would 
have been many Iraqis who were pleased to see him go, even if they were not 
equally pleased to witness the US arrive. The dilemma faced by many Iraqis was 
precisely that; they wanted Saddam to be overthrown, but did not relish the 
prospect of being a “defeated” country. (Downes 2006) There was a chance to 
capitalise on the happiness and relief many Iraqis would have felt at the removal 
of Saddam from power, but it would necessitate careful handling and a complete 
lack of victor posturing by the US. Although early messages from the US promised 
that the war was with Saddam, not Iraqis, initial jubilation at his removal was 
quickly clouded by the chaotic turn of events on the ground. 
 
 
 
Within these first few weeks the US had a chance to win trust, take decisive 
control, and send a clear message. One of the avenues available to them should 
have been the Iraqi Media Network (IMN). Don North, a veteran television 
producer, had been asked by Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC) 
to head up the IMN in post war Iraq. This contract had come from the Pentagon12 
and was to comprise a full media system including a daily newspaper, a national 
television station, and a national radio station. (Chandrasekaran 2006) It was an 
impressive scope, and when North accepted the job he was eager to start planning 
for how they would accomplish the remarkable job of setting all this in place in a 
post-conflict country. The IMN should have been a tremendous asset to the 
coalition and the US; able to present news and information in a manner favourable 
to them. However, the shambolic planning and set up, and the complete lack of 
prioritization for the IMN meant that it was useless. 
 
 
 
12 
After some internal manoeuvring by Feith and his assistants. 
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Before setting off for Iraq, North was informed that much of the planning and pre- 
purchasing had already been completed, but when he saw the equipment that had 
been purchased he was dismayed. „It was like they bought everything from a flea 
market in London,” he stated. (Chandrasekaran 2006,147) North had planned to 
use the studios and equipment in the Iraqi Ministry of Information, including their 
transmission equipment; however, this building was hit by a direct strike from the 
US military and completely razed. 
 
 
 
The building had contained the equipment and studios for the Iraqi Broadcasting 
and Television Establishment (IBTE), an organization under the control of the 
Ministry of Information in which it was housed. Under Saddam strict controls were 
in place regarding all forms of media, and only sanctioned messages were 
broadcast, usually full of praise for Saddam. (al-Khalil 1989) Up until the last hours 
of conventional warfare high ranking party members continued to try to spin the 
news into tales of glorious success for Saddam (the most notable of these being 
„Chemical Ali‟, whose farcical pronouncements were widely reported on), however 
the grip on the media had been lost. This would have been the perfect time to 
bring a fully operational IMN into the picture, however once again a lull in US 
activities was visible. Enterprising Iraqis stepped into this breach and started to 
sell satellite dishes, items previously banned and unavailable to the majority of 
Iraqis. With these dishes Iraqis could pick up on world news broadcasts, and 
perhaps most importantly they could access stations such as al-Jazeera. This 
Arabic language station did not portray the invasion in a positive light, and was 
highly critical of the US and its actions. By insisting on viewing themselves as 
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liberators rather than occupiers, and with a particularly laissez faire approach to 
liberation, the US was ceding ground. An occupier could have restricted access to 
media for a short time, but a liberator in the style of the US “hands off” model 
could not do the same. As such, the control was removed but nothing credible was 
put forward to take the place of the previous structures. (Chandrasekaran 2006) 
 
 
 
The IMN had issues beyond the shoddy equipment that greatly affected its 
credibility with an Iraqi audience. Don North eventually ended up naming it 
“Project Frustration” and quitting in July 2003, stating in January 2004 that “…a 
credible media has not been realized”. (North 2004) He referred to the level of 
control that the CPA demanded, including insisting that all their news conferences 
and other events be covered. CPA officials went as far as to rehire staff fired by 
Ahmad Al Rikaby, stating that only the CPA could make staffing decisions. Under 
Bremer the CPA was known for its lofty goals, coupled with a belief that it was the 
highest level of authority in Iraq. This led it to interfere and micro manage 
projects. This was not competent planning, but rather destructive short-term 
micromanagement that stymied the efforts of those experts who were attempting 
to create a true free press. Under CPA interference the IMN became a mouthpiece 
for the occupation; unable to critique US actions and hardly a bastion of press 
freedom. Despite the large sums of money granted to the overall project, the 
ground level situation continued to be dire in terms of equipment, with North 
stating that requests for essential items costing under $500 were routinely denied. 
The continuing decline of journalistic standards, coupled with the easy access to 
satellite broadcasts sounded the death knell for the IMN. By 2004 a State 
Department poll showed just 12% of Iraqis were watching the broadcasts or using it 
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as a news source, with the vast majority instead turning to al-Jazeera or al-Arabiya 
 
(63%). (North 2004) 
 
 
 
 
By insisting on turning the IMN into a coalition mouthpiece, the US administration 
made a serious error. Iraqis, bombarded for decades with propaganda, were well 
able to recognize it when they saw it and dismiss it as such. The credibility of the 
IMN was destroyed, whilst simultaneously access to credible but perhaps anti- 
American biased news sources was granted. Against this backdrop the US 
administration within Iraq would have to work even harder to regain the control of 
the message that they had ceded. 
 
 
 
Of course, some CPA actions were so drastically short sighted that it would be hard 
within Iraq to couch them in positive language. The first two orders of the CPA 
under Bremer were the now infamous de-Ba‟athification order, and the dissolution 
of entities created by Saddam, including and mainly affecting the military. 
 
 
 
Although these acts were in themselves 4GW failures, their communications impact 
is also important. The juxtaposition of these orders against previous inaction gave 
a mixed message regarding US levels of control and long term aims. A confusion in 
the message only adds to mistrust and the perception of incompetency. The US 
had initially made it clear that they expected the Iraqi people to take charge of a 
post-conflict Iraq. After the end of conventional warfare however this message was 
muddied by the orders and micromanaging nature of the CPA. As oppose  to leaving 
governance to Iraqis, the CPA moved to take detailed control of many aspects of 
Iraqi reconstruction, attempting to crudely graft uniquely Western elements into 
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Iraqi governance and society. In my opinion the US was here falling in-between two 
models for post-conflict presence, and failing to capitalize on either. 
 
 
 
The initial order dissolved the Ba‟ath party, but went further than that to state 
that all members of the Ba‟ath party were “removed from their positions and 
banned from future employment in the public sector”, effectively banning them 
from being at all involved in the restructuring of Iraq. (Galbraith 2006) Although 
this could at the surface layer be seen as a decisive blow against the old regime, it 
was in fact disastrously naïve and short sighted. In Iraq, there had only been the 
Ba‟ath Party, no other political party had been allowed to exist, hence there was 
no opposition party that could be turned to for the provision of leadership or 
guidance. Under Saddam, all professionals above a certain level had been forced 
to join the Ba‟ath party to continue to advance in their careers, or even to retain 
them. (Chandrasekaran 2006) By refusing to allow any Ba‟ath party members to 
hold positions of responsibility, Bremer had in one pen stroke managed to 
disenfranchise all the doctors, lawyers, managers, directors, and other people 
essential for the running of Iraq‟s infrastructure. For those who had been 
expecting something similar to South Africa‟s Truth and Reconciliation practice 
this was a terrible blow to their plans. Iraqis who had joined the Ba‟ath party 
under coercion and had never played an active role in the party were treated the 
same as those who had believed its ideology and accepted an active role. In 
psywar terms, this disenfranchisement of the very people who had run Iraq in the 
past demonstrated the perceived lack of trust the US administration had in the 
Iraqi people, despite their proclamations to the contrary. 
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The second order further undermined any trust that the US was there to liberate 
Iraqis and then leave as promised. This order disbanded the Iraqi military. Some 
years on from the event, Bremer would argue that there was no army left to 
disband, and the order he signed had been a mere formality recognizing that the 
Iraqi army had already disbanded themselves. (Bremer 2007) Others, such as 
Walter Slocombe, the civilian who had been asked to take control of the Iraqi 
military, disagree. (Chandrasekaran 2006, 80) The Iraqi army had mostly left their 
bases and returned to their homes even before the end of the conventional 
warfare. Numerous leaflets and other propaganda from the US, including President 
George W. Bush‟s speech on the eve of war, had encouraged them to do so. The 
leaders of the army however insist that they were ready and waiting to be called 
up again, to serve a new Iraq. One lieutenant colonel, Mustafa Duleimi, stated as 
Bremer landed; “We‟re waiting for our orders.”  (Chandrasekaran 2006, 81) Bremer 
took the view that as there were no visible Iraqi army battalions camped around 
Baghdad in surrender, and as the bases had been looted, there was no existing 
Iraqi army. He further stated that to retain the old army would have eroded trust 
in the US, using as an example the Iraqi police force, most of which was kept on 
and has since proved untrustworthy. (Rumsfeld 2011) What he failed to address 
was the fact that signing an order that disbanded the army without engaging in any 
dialogue with them first created a section of Iraqi society that was armed, trained, 
and robbed of their prestige, not to mention pay and careers. 
 
 
 
The Iraqis affected by these two orders were the exact segment of society that a 
great deal of psywar effort should have been poured into. These were the 
managers, the professionals, the armed and ready fighters who could have been an 
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enormous help and support to the US efforts. Not all of these Iraqis would have 
been willing to work with the US, and some would have been entrenched in the 
resistance to US efforts. Those that it would have been impossible to convert did 
need to be removed from power and neutralized, however no effort was made to 
distinguish between the enemy, supporters, and those who were wavering in the 
neutral zone and could have been co-opted. Through these two orders the CPA did 
move those who were neutral and undecided about whether to resist or support 
the US, however they moved them into opposition instead of support. It would be 
near impossible for the army, disbanded with no honour, no pay, and no 
consultation, to support the US now. In fact, it was even seen by some as a 
mistake not to have resisted the US led invasion more fiercely. Some soldiers felt 
that they had trusted the US by abandoning their bases, and this act of good faith 
was used against them. One ex-military man lamented the perceived betrayal: “I 
was a big man in the old air force defence corps, but now I am nothing. They have 
abolished the army and the police and replaced it with nothing.” (Downes 2006, 
57) 
 
 
 
 
The failures highlighted in this chapter are merely the most obvious manifestations 
of the overall failure of the US military and administration to develop their 
practices to succeed in 4GW. Had they developed this capability the US would have 
stood a much better chance of forestalling the rise of the networked insurgency 
that arose. Through these notable missteps the US alienated a large and crucial 
segment of the population, lost control of the message and allowed others to co- 
opt it, and surrendered the monopoly on force crucial to maintaining law and order 
and thus winning Iraqi trust. Within 24 hours of „winning the war, the US had 
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started to lose prestige, respect, and most vitally the trust of the people they 
claimed to be liberating. This downward trajectory continued, and it would take 
years of scrambling around in the chaos and mess of a fracturing Iraq before any 
sort of cohesive and coherent post war plans emerged. By that time an insurgency 
was taking its toll on US personnel, the financial costs of war on the US were 
spiralling every upwards, and Iraq had become a morass of newly formed terrorist 
groups using the occupation as justification. 
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Conclusion: Imaginary Flowers no Substitute for Evolution 
 
 
 
 
“When I asked, for instance, if the Administration was too enamoured of the idea 
that Iraqis would greet American troops with flowers, he argued that some Iraqis 
were still too intimidated by the remnants of Saddam‟s Baath Party to express 
their emotions openly. “But,” Feith said, “they had flowers in their minds.”” 
(Goldberg 2005) 
 
 
 
Those who promulgate the view that military might alone is sufficient to achieve 
foreign policy aims would have been immensely frustrated by the intransigent 
refusal of the 2003 Iraq invasion to follow the plans laid out. Despite vast 
technological superiority and fast manoeuvrability, the highly equipped US war 
machine found itself eventually enmeshed in the tangle of tribal politics, billion 
dollar rebuilds of utilities infrastructure, and in propping up a country best 
described as a failed state in a post-conflict situation. Military might held no 
power over public opinion. Iraqis did not form a cohesive grateful whole, thankful 
to the US for the removal of Saddam, but instead fractured into multiple groups 
who often seemed to have hatred of the US as their only common factor; a classic 
4GW insurgency. Within the US the fervour for war quickly dimmed to the extent 
that as early as the end of 2003 the military was planning that the strategic centre 
of gravity should be “coalition public opinion”, with the acceptance that “At best, 
we have only the most grudging support of the Iraqi people...most of them want us 
to leave as soon as possible.” (Gordon and Trainor 2013, 98) In short, the “flowers 
in their minds” had proved to exist only in the rosy mental gardens of the planners 
in the US. 
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The political aims the US wished to achieve could not be realised by short term 
military force alone. As covered in Chapter One, 4GW is not unique in its 
requirement to harmonise the political and military aims for long lasting success, 
however the importance of targeting the political will is paramount in 4GW. 4GW 
calls for a population centric approach to warfare, in which the political will of the 
people is the primary goal. As in COIN the enemy must be cut off from their 
support; both internal and external. The severance of the enemy from his support 
cannot be accomplished via traditional military means in isolation, such as 
checkpoints and patrols, as support refers not only to physical elements such as 
weapons and supplies, but also to tacit and philosophical support that the military 
cannot build mental checkpoints against or identify via an aerial drone survey. 
4GW demands time and labour intensive tactics in which every military action is 
used to advance an overall political aim. 
 
Politically the US administration believed that through military might they could 
impose an alien form of government on a land and culture they had not taken the 
trouble to attempt to understand other than in the terms of reference of their own 
civilisation. Unable or unwilling to countenance that US style democracy and 
freedom was not a shining beacon to which every civilisation aspired, they failed 
to show respect to the culture they were entering, and through this committed 
multiple faux-pas that hampered their efforts. 
 
 
 
These failures of planning did not need to translate into long term failure in 
theatre. It became increasingly clear to many on the ground within the early days 
of the occupation that the US could not act with impunity and achieve its goals; 
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however, a blinkered insistence on staying the course was the message from the 
top. Rather than exhibiting the hallmarks of an intelligent and learning 
organisation, and self critically examining tactics and strategy, the highest level 
decision makers continued down the path of a regime change that existed only in 
their minds and plethora of Power Point slides. At the very top levels of the US 
administration there seems to have been an unwillingness to play the long game; 
to invest time in training dedicated officers for particular regions around the 
globe, including taking the brightest and best to study languages, history  and 
culture, and build robust personal relationships with the indigenous power players. 
The failure to evolve comes from the top. 
 
 
 
The metrics of 4GW are not couched in the media friendly language of 3GW, in 
which it is possible to report on square miles gained and number of enemy killed. 
Although Rumsfeld firmly wished to change the military, his changes would not 
have seen it evolve in the manner needed to succeed in 4GW environments. His 
belief in military might measured in technological superiority and speed would 
instead have kept it preserved in the amber of a time of conflicts which the US 
would like to choose to engage in, however the enemy is not offering the US that 
choice. 
 
 
 
The US not only lost the momentum that could have carried them to a longer term 
victory, but gained the hatred and ire of many Iraqis. The narrative the US told 
itself about the war was an archaic fairy tale, a simple story of good versus bad 
with two dimensional characters lacking subtlety or nuance. 3GW tactics and 
strategies, coupled with a laissez-faire approach to liberation, shackled the 
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personnel involved to planning and execution that could not succeed in the 4GW 
environment. Ultimately, Douglas Feith‟s incredibly obtuse remark, “They had 
flowers in their minds” reveals not the mental state of Iraqis, but rather the US 
administration‟s refusal to face reality and evolve their practices to flourish in a 
world of 4GW engagements. 
 
 
 
The US faces some stark choices about future involvement in foreign conflicts. 
Over ten years after the Iraq invasion of 2003, there are calls for the US to 
abandon COIN altogether, and disengage from any type of “nation building”. (Gian 
2013) The costly and lingering involvements in Iraq and Afghanistan have blunted 
any public enthusiasm for future interventions, and led some commentators to 
state that COIN does not work. I would argue that COIN and psywar do not work if 
they are underfunded, deployed late, and given impossible aims. COIN and psywar 
alone are not tactical „silver bullets‟, capable of achieving any given aim with 
minimal casualties and cost. They should be part of an integrated whole of an 
approach that prioritises the will of the people as the target, and aims to satisfy 
US security requirements at a moral and financial cost the US can accept. Rather 
than grasping at new doctrine and relying on saviour generals, the US needs  to 
intellectually grasp and internalise the basic principles of soft power, psywar, and 
4GW to salvage and maintain a leading role on the global stage. If it fails to do so, 
the US, for all its military technological advancements, will become a lumbering 
dinosaur doomed to expensive and protracted failures in future military 
involvements. 
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